

PIRITUALITY
THEOLOGY
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CHRISTIAN ETHICS

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JAMES F. CHILDRESS
AND
JOHN MACQUARRIE



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cian," which is probably more popular in Roman Catholic moral theology.

JAMES F. CHILDRESS


Ethics

The word "ethics" is used in a variety of ways, and confusions between these uses are common. At least three main types of question are called "ethical" in different senses: (1) questions as to what is right, good, etc., or of how we ought to behave (normative ethics, morals); (2) questions as to the answers given by particular societies and people to questions of type (1) (descriptive ethics or comparative ethics, a branch of moral sociology or anthropology); and (3) questions as to the meanings or uses of the words used in answering questions of type (1), or the nature or logical character of the moral concepts, or, in older language, of what goodness, etc., are (theoretical ethics, philosophical ethics, moral philosophy). It is perhaps best, in philosophical writing, to reserve the word "ethics" (unqualified) for inquiries of type (3). The motive for undertaking them has, however, often been the hope that their results might bear on questions of type (1); whether and in what ways this is possible is the question that above all others vexes students of philosophical ethics, and divides the supporters of naturalism*, intuitionism*, emotivism*, descriptivism*, prescriptivism*, etc.

The simplest answer is given by naturalism and related theories, which hold that to understand the meanings of moral terms is already to be assured of the truth of certain general moral principles, from which, in conjunction with statements of fact, particular moral judgments can be derived. Against this it has been objected by the followers of G. E. Moore that moral principles are matters of substance, or synthetic, and therefore cannot be established by appeal to the meanings of words. More recent writers (prescriptivists) have added to this objection another, that, since moral judgments are prescriptive or action-guiding, they cannot be derived by logical deduction (with or without the use of definitions of terms) from merely factual premises. The substance of this objection goes back to Hume and Kant. Both these objections rely on the general logical principle (itself not undisputed) that the conclusion of an inference can contain nothing that is not there, at any rate implicitly, in the premises.

In a religious context, this controversy is most aptly illustrated by considering the suggestion that "wrong" means "contrary to God's will." If this were so, then we should at once be assured of the general moral principle that what is contrary to God's will is wrong (it would, indeed, be a veiled tautology); and from this, in conjunction with factual premises about what, in particular, God wills, we could deduce particular moral judgments about what is wrong. If objections about the difficulty of ascertaining God's will are ignored, there remain the objections: (1) that it must be matter of substance, not a mere tautology, that what is contrary to God's will is wrong; and (2) that no mere definition of terms could enable us to deduce the prescriptive judgment that something is wrong from the factual statement that it is contrary to God's will. It is further objected that it must be possible for a sufficiently perverse man to maintain without self-contradiction that an act is contrary to God's will but not wrong, or vice versa. Moreover, the word "wrong" is used, and apparently understood, by atheists, and it is not obvious that they are using it in a different sense from theists. For these reasons most philosophers would now reject the view that "wrong" means "contrary to God's will"; but this does not imply a refutation of the view that what (and only what) is contrary to God's will is wrong. The latter view (an answer to a question of type (1) rather than of type (3) above) is held by most Christians. It does not follow that Christians will agree with one another about all moral questions; for issues which among non-Christians would be treated as disputes about what is wrong, simply, will often be treated among Christians as "factual" disputes about what God's will is, it being assumed that, whatever it is, what is contrary to it is wrong. Often, there being no independent way of ascertaining God's will, it gets accommodated to the moral views of particular disputants. It is perhaps only when a speaker is prepared in this way freely to "tailor" what he calls "God's will" to his own moral opinions, that the expressions "contrary to God's will" and "wrong" can be said to be equivalents.

If we ask more positively what are the meanings, functions, natures, uses, etc., of moral words or concepts, we are, naturally, on controversial ground; but there are some points on which, perhaps, a majority of moral



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philosophers would agree, their differences being in matters of emphasis and interpretation. (1) It is a widely accepted view that moral judgments containing such words are in some strong and special sense action-guiding (for example, that there is a more than merely contingent connection between thinking an act the best in the circumstances and being disposed to choose it). This is the feature of moral words which is most emphasized by prescriptivists. (2) Most thinkers would agree that when words like "right," "wrong," "good," and "bad" are used, they are applied to acts, etc., in virtue of some feature or features of them (apart from their mere rightness, etc.) which is the *reason* for using these words of them. It is held by many to follow from this that to call one act, for example, wrong, is to commit oneself to call any other act wrong which resembles it in all, or in the relevant, particulars. This thesis has been called "the universalizability of moral judgments."*

These two theses are not inconsistent, though they can be made to appear so by mistaken interpretation, thus giving rise to needless disputes. This in turn has led to the rejection of one of the theses as incompatible with the other. For example, some naturalists have rejected (1), holding that moral judgments are action-guiding only in the sense in which any factual judgment whatever may be; the information that an act is the best in the circumstances will lead me to do that act, *if I want to do what is best*, just as the information that a stone is the flattest available will lead me to choose it, *if I want the flattest stone*; the effect of this is to turn moral judgments into something like Kant's "hypothetical imperatives." They have done this because they thought that, if thesis (2) is correct, the only thing that we can be doing in calling an act the best act is to inform our hearers that it possesses those features which entitle it to this name. If this were so, then the information would guide action only given a prior disposition (which might be absent) to do acts which have those features.

Against this, adherents of Thomism on the one hand, and many modern prescriptivists on the other, have insisted, in different ways, on thesis (1). This doctrine is summed up in the maxim, which goes back in substance to Socrates, *Quicquid appetitur, appetitur sub specie boni* (Whatever is desired, is desired under the appearance of its being good).

Thesis (2) is incompatible with thesis (1) only if we take (2) as implying that when we call an act, for example, the best, and do so in virtue of something about it, we are doing the same sort of thing as when we call, for example, a surface red in virtue of something about it (its visual appearance under normal conditions). In the latter case to know the meaning of "red" is to know that we are entitled to call a surface red if, and only if, it appears *thus* under normal conditions. If "best" functioned like "red," then, once its meaning was known, there would be no choice left as to what sorts of acts we could call best. And this would lead to a dilemma. Either we should have to reject thesis (1); or else we should have to maintain that to think some act the best is, indeed, to be disposed to do it, but that, once we know the meaning of "best," what sorts of thing we are disposed to do become unalterably fixed; and this runs counter both to our common understanding of the meaning of "best," and to our feeling that to know the meaning of a word can never restrict our freedom of choice in this way.

Faced with this dilemma, some have felt that, sooner than reject thesis (1), it is best to reject thesis (2), and deny that acts are necessarily called "the best" in virtue of *anything* about them. But we can avoid this implausible conclusion by interpreting thesis (2) more carefully; it can be taken as implying, not that the meaning of words like "best" ties them to *particular* features of, for example, acts (the same for all users of the word) but rather that whenever anybody uses the word, he must have in mind, as his reason for using it, *some* features of the act in question (which, if repeated in any other acts in relevantly similar situations, would oblige him to call them, too, the best in their respective situations, or else to withdraw his judgment about this present situation); but these features might differ from speaker to speaker, depending on their various moral opinions, without thereby the *meaning* (in one sense) of the word "best," as used by them, altering. In other words, the user of the word 'best' thereby commits himself to *some* rule for its application, but there is no single rule to which all users of the word are committed by its meaning. The rule followed by any speaker will depend on his own moral principles as to what is best in this type of situation. For certain necessary qualifications to this statement, see Conventional Morality.

there would be no such thing as moral action. It may be argued, however, that even on a determinist view we need not hold that we are always governed by the desire, or group of desires, felt most strongly, for we have no ground for saying that the causal efficacy of a desire needs always to be in proportion to its felt strength. Determinism is the thesis that all our actions are determined, but it need not imply that they are determined in any one particular way.

The whole idea of a mental action of volition has recently been questioned in some quarters, but while it is unreasonable to suppose that every voluntary act has to be preceded by a specific volition, one can hardly deny the occurrence of decisions and efforts as psychological events. And while we cannot limit voluntary action to action preceded by a choice, we can hardly regard an act as voluntary unless the agent could at least have done differently if he or she had chosen. Whether the act could be regarded as free unless the agent could also have chosen differently without previous circumstances having been in any way different is a point in dispute between determinists and indeterminists.

See Act, Action, Agent; Decision; Deliberation; Free Will and Determinism; Responsibility.

A. C. EWING

Christendom Group

see Anglican Moral Theology

Christian Ethics

Other entries deal with the ethics of various Christian traditions; this one attends to the patterns of Christian ethical writing, their elements and their relations to each other.

Themes. Writings that are systematic have organizing themes (metaphors, analogies, symbols, principles) around which other theological and ethical ideas and concepts cohere. The themes may be theological or ethical, or combinations of the two. Some examples follow: (a) The theme that backs H. R. Niebuhr's "ethics of responsibility" is anthropological; persons are responders or answerers more than "makers" or "citizens." The theological theme of "God acting in events" to which persons respond coheres with this, as do such procedures as the interpretation of events. (b) *Agapē* is the supreme moral principle of Christian ethics for Paul Ramsey. Its supremacy is backed by his in-

terpretation of biblical theology. Since it is a rule term for him, and since he believes that biblical ethics are deontological, his practical procedures for making choices cohere with his view of *agapē*. (c) Luther's theology distinguishes but does not separate the work of God as creator and as redeemer. His ethics of the civic use of the law and of an agent-oriented freedom and love cohere with these themes. They are related to each other; Christians act out of freedom and love in obedience to the law and in their offices in orders of creation. (d) Augustine interprets human action as motivated by desires and directed toward ends. His view of rightly or wrongly ordered persons and acts coheres with his theological principle that all things are to be ordered proportionately in relation to God, the supreme good.

Base points. Comprehensive Christian ethical writings have four distinguishable base points, or points of reference. They are coherent insofar as the base points are organized around themes, as stated above. The base points are: (1) theological interpretation in a restricted sense—that is, the understanding and interpretation of God, God's relations to the world and particularly to human beings, and God's purposes; (2) the interpretation of the meaning and significance of human experience and history, of events and circumstances in which human beings act, and of nature; (3) the interpretation of persons or communities as moral agents, and of their acts; and (4) the interpretation of how persons and communities ought to make moral choices and judge their actions, those of others, and the states of affairs in the world.

1. How the interpretation of God is developed is critical for ethics. Process theology has implications for ethics that differ from those based upon an eternal and immutable divine order. The use of personal or interpersonal concepts to understand God and God's relations to the world will yield different ethics than a view of God as impersonal being. Christological choices are critical. If Christ reveals God to be primarily a gracious God, and if interpersonal concepts are used to understand God's relations to persons, one has ethics like Karl Barth's. If Christ is the one in and through whom all things are created, there is a Christological foundation for ethics of natural law, as in the Roman Catholic tradition. If Christ is the one through whom the divinization of man takes place, as in

Eastern Orthodox theology, the ethical implications are different in yet another way.

2. The concepts or symbols used to interpret experience and events are critical. If God is acting for the liberation of human life, experience and events have a different religious and ethical significance than in an interpretation based upon an immutable moral order of creation. If events are interpreted on the basis of the great power of evil in the world, they have a different significance than in an interpretation that views the power of good to be more in control. Christological choices affect how experience and events are interpreted. If Christ is a new "seed" implanted in history that is "organically" spreading through life (e.g., Schleiermacher), events will have a different significance than in a view that sees the crucifixion as the primary way to understand them (e.g., H. R. Niebuhr on war). Judgments about eschatology affect the interpretation of events. If the coming of the kingdom of God is almost totally, or totally, a future event, eschatology will function differently in Christian ethics than in a view that sees the kingdom as the fulfillment of a historical end. If it is interpreted as a social ideal (e.g., Rauschenbusch) certain goals can be inferred from it to direct action; from other perspectives it stands basically as a critical principle relativizing and judging all human ends.

3. The interpretation of persons and their acts has ramifications for ethics. If human actions are strongly conditioned, or determined, by desires (e.g., Augustine and Jonathan Edwards), Christian ethics takes a different shape from views that accent more strongly the freedom of the will. The decision that theologians make on various grounds about a theory of human action qualifies decisively the ethics they develop. Christological judgments are important here as well. If human beings are basically sinners, though justified by the work of Christ, persons and actions will be interpreted differently than in a view that stresses the present efficacy of redemption and sanctification.

4. Both the procedures and the content of the prescriptive or normative ethics in Christian writings require specific development. How they are developed depends on different sorts of choices that a theologian makes. One choice is of the fundamental shape of ethics; theologians back their choices in different ways. Paul Ramsey, for example, argues that Christian ethics is deontic because biblical

ethics is. For others (e.g., Paul Lehmann), biblical theology supports a view of acting in events in ways consonant with God's humanizing purposes. For both theological and philosophical reasons other writers develop Christian ethics in a teleological manner. In interpretations of Christ make a difference. If Christ reveals the norm or ideal of true humanity, his life and teachings become morally normative and the procedures of moral life are discipleship or imitation and the application of his teaching to current actions. If his significance is primarily related to the redemption of persons, the norm is more that of dispositions from which moral actions flow; one gets a more "agent-oriented" ethics.

If the writings are both comprehensive and coherent, the three base points will be integrally related to one another.

Sources. Comprehensive Christian ethical writings use four distinguishable sources: (1) the Bible and the Christian tradition, (2) philosophical principles and methods, (3) science and other sources of knowledge about the world, and (4) human experience broadly conceived. Writers make judgments about these sources and about the weight or authority each has. Four kinds of judgments are made, namely, about which sources are relevant and why; which sources are decisive when they conflict, and why; what specific content is to be used from these sources and what is to be ignored or rejected, and why; and how this content is to be interpreted and why it is to be so interpreted.

1. All four kinds of judgments are made in the use of biblical materials and sources from the Christian tradition. Even if, as some argue, Christian ethics begins with biblical exegesis, choices are made about what biblical themes and passages are central. A basic choice is whether the biblical material will be used primarily for theological purposes that ground or back the development of ethics, or whether the moral teachings of the Bible will be treated as a revealed source of ethics. For example, the ethics of liberal Protestantism tended to use the NT, and particularly the Gospels, as a "revealed" source of moral ideals, ends, examples, and teachings. With the turn toward "biblical theology," ethics were grounded in various theological themes from the Bible, such as God acting in history, human beings as sinners, or the kingdom of God as breaking into history. Different theological themes from the Bible ground differ-

emphases in ethics. How the moral teachings in the Bible are related to the biblical theologies varies—e.g., for Barth they are instruction and give direction; for others they are ideals, principles, or rules.

Discernible differences can be found in writings from various Christian traditions; great theologians or historical movements establish patterns that persist. Examples: the use of natural law in the Roman Catholic tradition; the distinction between law and gospel and between the heavenly and earthly realms in the Lutheran tradition; the emphasis on following Christ as he is portrayed in the Gospels and on rigorous obedience to his teachings in the Radical Reformation tradition; the marked mystical aspects of ethics in the Eastern Orthodox tradition. Received traditions undergo development and change; an example is the rethinking of natural law in contemporary Roman Catholic theology in the light of more historical consciousness and stress on the "personal" character of human life.

2. Judgments are made about philosophical principles and methods. Writers sometimes explicitly adapt patterns from philosophy (e.g., Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism, existentialism) because they believe they are consonant with a theology, or they use them to explicate the ethical implications of a theology, or they determine on philosophical grounds what the science of ethics is to which theology must be related. Sometimes the judgments about philosophy are implicit, sometimes they are defended on theological or other grounds.

Persistent themes in Christian ethics are developed differently, depending on philosophical choices made by the author. For example, love functions differently in Christian ethical writings that are deontic in mode from those that are primarily agent-oriented; in the former it is basically a principle or rule term, and in the latter it indicates a disposition of persons. Appeals to the Bible are not decisive in this matter; there is no philosophical theory of ethics in the Bible, and terms like love are used to refer to different aspects of moral life.

3. Applications of Christian ethics, no matter what choices are made on any of the previous items, use sources of information and insight about the sphere of activity that is attended to. Differences occur in part as a result of the different data that are used, even

about the same general area of interest. For example, to understand persons as agents some writers turn to particular psychologists, others to particular philosophers. The choice of data requires defense on the basis of its adequacy. Concepts used to interpret information also vary; for example, Christians influenced by Marxist interpretations understand the relations between ethics and economics differently from those who judge modified free-market interpretations to be more accurate.

4. Broader understandings of human experience in general affect how Christian ethics are developed. Insight is drawn not only from academic disciplines, but also from literature and art, and from the residues of moral experience embedded in custom and habit. The choices affect some basic postures toward the world. For example, the weight of a writer's judgment on a continuum from determinism to radical freedom may be affected not only by philosophical and scientific scholarship but also by the author's own experiences or by reflections gained from observations about historical events, etc.

All four types of judgments mentioned above are made about all four sources of Christian ethical writings.

Whether and how ethical writings are Christian depends upon the significance that Christ or Christology has for them. Christological judgments are critical to how ethical writings are Christian. Writers who view the Gospel narratives and teachings exclusively as a source for a sublime moral code, or for an ideal moral and social life, think in terms of the application of the teachings or realization of the ideal. For them, the significance of Christ is restricted to morality. For others, Christ is the revelation of the nature of God and God's relation to the world; for example, in Christ God is known as a gracious God who is "for man." Sometimes the focus is on the redeeming work of Christ; this calls attention to the efficacy of that work for the qualities of life of persons. Further judgments about the doctrine of sanctification will affect the interpretation of the Christian moral life. If the significance of Christ's work is forensic, the freedom of the Christian is stressed; if it is also efficacious in the reordering of motives and desires, claims are made for moral progress in Christian life.

Combinations and qualifications of these tendencies occur in various writings. The

view of Christ as teacher and example might be backed, not by the judgment that is strictly moral, but by the idea that the form of God's revelation (i.e., in and through Christ) provides the pattern of life appropriate to those who believe in Christ and receive his benefits. Or, if the principal significance is what is revealed about God's goodness, the life and teachings can be signs or indicators of the kinds of deeds that those who respond to God's goodness ought to be doing. In the NT there are grounds for various foci of Christological development, and thus for different explications of what and how ethics can be Christian.

See also Anglican Moral Theology; Bible in Christian Ethics; Eastern Orthodox Christian Ethics; Modern Protestant Ethics; Modern Roman Catholic Moral Theology; Moral Theology.

J. M. Gustafson, *Christ and the Moral Life*, 1968; *Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics*, 1978; E. L. Long, Jr., *A Survey of Christian Ethics*, 1967; *A Survey of Recent Christian Ethics*, 1982; H. R. Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, 1951.

JAMES M. GUSTAFSON

Christian Social Movement

see Anglican Moral Theology

Church

This term is used in widely divergent ways. It is commonly applied to buildings for Christian worship, to a congregation gathered for worship, to the institution that owns the building and organizes the worship, to the regional or national collective membership of a denomination, to the membership of all denominations, or, in some branches of Christianity, to the official leadership of a denomination. More theologically, the term may be applied to the "mystical body of Christ," to the company of all believers of all times and places (church universal) or to those within and without the institutional church (including "anonymous Christians" who belong to other religions) who are known by (or "elected" by) God to be faithful (church invisible). The term has also been taken into Western jurisprudence in ways that mean, by extension, that Islamic mosques, Jewish synagogues, Hindu temples, etc., are given legal status as "churches" in

documents defining church-state relationships and religious liberties. Still further, some cross-cultural analysis has utilized the term "church" to apply to the typical kinds of "holy" or "sacred" social organization which every religion develops (although such organizations differ widely in character). Thus, the caste is held by some to be the "church" in some Hindu groups, the order of monks in some Buddhist groups, the "party" in Marxist-Leninist "secular religion," the clan in traditional "Chinese religion," or the tribe in primal religions, etc.

In Christian ethics since the historical-sociological work of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, however, "church" has come to be understood as a technical term that refers to a type of Christian social organization, based on characteristic understandings of theological first principles as institutionalized in distinctive ways in society to form a social ethic. In the process of selecting, clarifying, organizing, and institutionalizing first principles in various cultural, political, and economic contexts, the "church" takes on a normative social form that is a compound of religious convictions, apologetic, pastoral, and cultic needs, functional organizational requirements in coordinating right teaching and practice, and compromise with secular institutional realities of the context in which it finds itself. The church, thus defined, attempts to be a socially inclusive institution both in the sense that it tries to draw the entire population into itself and in the sense that it attempts to cooperate with and normatively inform all other sectors of social life—familial, economic, political, intellectual, and social. The more absolutistic and perfectionistic demands of the gospel are, for the masses, modulated and adapted to the realities of natural and historical life, although the church may contain within itself specialized institutions (such as monastic orders) where these demands are taken as primary. The church usually attempts to establish a specialized and hierarchically organized priesthood with a relative monopoly on authoritative teaching, preaching, and sacramental care, and there is often close cooperation with political authority to maintain this pattern. On these bases, the church develops its ethic, an explicit "Christian social philosophy," intended to be a comprehensive guide to the common life. Troeltsch argues that

liberation. This, however, was a rather exceptional application of the Buddhist way, which prides itself on the fact that it has not generated any religious wars.

S. Collins, *Selfless Persons*, 1982; H. Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, 1932; F. E. Reynolds, "Buddhist Ethics: A Bibliographical Essay," *Religious Studies Review* 5, no. 1, 1979, pp. 40-48; H. Saddhatissa, *Buddhist Ethics: Essence of Buddhism*, 1970.

NINIAN SMART

Business Ethics

Business ethics is distinct from a more general economic ethics because of the unique roles and responsibilities of persons connected to the modern business corporation: stockholders, professional managers, entrepreneurs, and, in a different way, employees and labor. Business activities are as old as merchants and exchange but this special constellation of moral agents is relatively new, dating back to the advent of modern market society in the 18th century and developing in new directions in the 19th and 20th centuries with the growth of (1) stock ownership; (2) the separation of ownership and management in the large corporation; (3) the development of transnational corporations with their complex internal divisions of labor across national lines, their international financial structures, and their capacity to move capital quickly throughout the world, often rivaling governments in economic power and escaping various levels of government control; and (4) the emergence of a class of professional managers who, because of the power of the modern corporation, often act as "quasi-public officials" (Lindblom), and who move back and forth across the lines of private and public management. The critical role of management in the large institutions of modern society, private or public, capitalist or socialist, has blurred the line between a strictly business ethics and a more general management ethics.

Christian ethical teaching has been slow in coming to grips with these developments. Traditional teachings in the Middle Ages on the just price*, usury*, property*, and work* were part of a larger framework presupposing traditional forms of social and economic life and often hostile to business activities per se. After the development of modern market

society Protestant social teaching has tended in two contrary directions: It has emphasized the individual's calling and personal integrity, often celebrating the businessperson's capacity for charity and usually ignoring the structural realities of modern capitalism*, thereby baptizing these realities; or, concerned about the competitive individualism of capitalism and the great social inequalities created by capitalism, it has proffered various communal and socialist forms of economic organization, sometimes influenced by Marxism but as often not. The great bulk of Protestant teaching has been too individualistic to mount a sustained critique of, and ethics for, the large corporate forms of modern economic life. In the USA, only during the 1930s did Protestantism find in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and other "protestant realists" (see Realism) an articulation of the power realities of modern social life that countered prevailing individualistic assumptions. While this ethic of social power made signal contributions to legitimating labor movements and unions and, to a lesser extent, government regulation of business, it did not yet provide a framework for understanding large corporate institutions and moral agency within them.

Roman Catholic thought, never as intertwined with individualism, was much earlier and more thorough in offering teaching about modern industrial life. A series of important encyclicals, *Rerum Novarum* (1891), *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), *Mater et Magistra* (1961), and *Populorum Progressio* (1967), recognized the exposed position of labor in modern society, arguing for the right to work, the importance of labor unions, and the obligation of government to protect the poor and weak; strove to find a middle way between "individualism"* and "collectivism"*; offered principles for the organization of social and economic life (including the principle of subsidiarity*) that would disperse power and responsibility and protect different levels of community; and called on the rich nations to help the poor nations in order to correct the defects of the world market (see also Official Roman Catholic Social Teaching). It should also be noted that the ecumenical movement* as represented by the World Council of Churches and various national church councils has done much to work for social justice and to draw attention to the plight of the hundreds of millions of

peoples either outside the mainstream of modern industrial life or subservient to it. But all these efforts, as important as they are, have dealt chiefly with systemic economic problems and not with the ethical problems of modern corporate organization.

Three historical reasons lie behind this failure. First is the ironic relation between Protestant ethical life and capitalism*, documented by Weber and Tawney. The Weber thesis is that Protestant teaching, especially Calvin's, contained a tension between the moral command to pursue rigorously one's vocation* in this world as a response to and a sign of God's election, and the moral injunction against ostentation and spending, a tension that Weber called "this-worldly asceticism" and that yielded, unintentionally, a propensity to save (and thus to accumulate capital) as well as to prize rational calculation in business. Although much debated, Weber's thesis stands as a classic statement of the way in which a religious ethic can legitimate a social and economic form that was no part of its original intention. Most important, this ironic connection has made much capitalist business activity impervious to conscious ethical direction, a double irony in light of the fact that later Calvinists often forgot Calvin's teaching that abundance should be shared with the poor, and the fact that in modern capitalism an ethic of consumption has long replaced the ethic of asceticism.

Second, the classic statements of market capitalism have expressly disconnected normal conceptions of moral agency from economic action. In effect, Adam Smith and others suggested that in the economic realm the pure pursuit of self-interest would yield public benefits because of the disciplining coordination of competitive market exchange (called the "price system" in neoclassical economics). In this revolutionary transformation of the understanding of economics, ethics was reduced to privately held values and the face-to-face relations of family and small communities, while economic pursuits were released from ethical constraint. This viewpoint persists in much of the scholarly and the broader public alike, in spite of the fact that virtually no one subscribes to the 18th-century teleological world view that alone made Smith's hypotheses intelligible.

The third reason, peculiar to the USA, is that the American Constitution, following

the concern of the Federalists that large private economic structures would threaten republican democracy, assigned the power of incorporation to the states on the fallacious assumption that the power of private corporations would thereby remain less than the power of the individual states. The contrary in fact happened. States competed with each other for business investment by writing liberal laws of incorporation, with the result that corporations far transcend state boundaries and purposes and, with the transnational corporation, national boundaries and purposes.

The upshot of this history is that modern business structures and activities have virtually no intended connection to their moral and political foundations and are often in direct conflict with those foundations. The fundamental task of Christian ethics in the modern world must be to formulate an ethic that takes seriously this situation and its history. Two developments in the last ten to fifteen years make important steps in this direction.

The first is the increased participation by churches and other eleemosynary institutions (especially universities and foundations) in a spectrum of shareholder activities designed to monitor, modify, and correct egregious social harm done by those corporations in which they hold stock. Not only have such efforts led to changed corporate behavior (notably in the areas of foreign investment in South Africa, environmental impact, Third World marketing practices, and community and employee relations), they also have contributed to legal decisions and literature clarifying the role of stockholders in the modern corporation.

The second development is the growth of ethics courses within business school curricula. Ethics courses had existed before, but these tended either to focus on problems of personal integrity in relation to specific cases or to be part of broader "business and society" programs that lacked genuine moral analysis. The more recent efforts have often involved teachers of ethics from the fields of philosophy, religion, and theology. The entrance of philosophers into this arena has occasioned a spate of writing on business ethics, especially on questions of moral agency in business institutions and on problems of competing claims and rights. On the whole, however, the philosophical approach to business ethics has suffered from the modern

philosophical preoccupation with metaethics and epistemology. The standard approach of philosophical introductions to business ethics is to give a short outline of competing modern ethical theories (deontological, teleological, egoistic, etc.), not only rendering the issues unnecessarily abstract but also inadvertently lending credence to the moral relativism already rampant in the classroom.

In principle, theological approaches to business ethics, if they can overcome the initial alarm at (or familiarity with) things religious, have the potential to be more powerful and illuminating because of the prophetic-critical aspects of Christian moral inquiry. In this light, a complete ethics of business, focusing on management as the moral agent, would include the following themes and dimensions:

1. The development of those personal characteristics and capacities essential for all moral judgments: moral identity; character and virtue; moral perception and imagination; the capacity for ordering, judgment, and self-criticism; and critical reflection about vocation, work, and the human community.

2. A critical ethical analysis of institutions* in general, with special attention to institutional roles and moral agency; the parallel between individual virtues (and vices) and institutional patterns; the nature of power in institutions and the tendency of power to distort perception, communication, and moral agency.

3. A critical ethical analysis of the special features of the modern business corporation, including the history and ideology of the corporation and business; the various "constituencies" or "stakeholders" of the corporation (labor, owners, management, community, suppliers, customers, nation); and the inherent tension (but not necessarily opposition) between two corporate dimensions: (a) its pursuit of profits, the emphasis on instrumental reason and values, the focus on "external goods"; and (b) the corporation's moral subservience to—and reliance on—cooperation and the cooperative virtues, human ends, "internal goods."

4. A critical ethical analysis of market society and capitalism, including its history and ideology; the peculiar relation and roles of owners and workers and the special vulnerability of the latter; the strengths and weaknesses of the market as a system of social

coordination; the impact of markets and business in the Third World; and especially a normative framework for understanding the appropriate spheres and limits of exchange relationships in human society.

5. An integrating of these elements of moral judgment with the perceptual and analytical tools of managerial judgment. This inevitably involves the use of cases and of cross-disciplinary work. If integrated, they may yield a fairly radical understanding of management responsibility together with possible institutional health. If not integrated, they will be perceived as external constraints to be observed when possible but the first to go as luxuries in difficult times.

Three concluding points about such a program. First, any one of these themes pushed far enough will reach its theological foundation and presuppositions about human vocation, the nature and meaning of community, of human work and creation, of freedom and history, of the ground and extent of evil and wrongdoing.

Second, and consequently, any such program of business ethics has necessarily subversive aspects insofar as the moral identity not only of the Christian but of any thoughtful person must transcend the roles, responsibilities, and purposes of the business institution. It is in such a light that programs of corporate responsibility within businesses must be evaluated. If they do not include a frank awareness that moral identity and loyalty *must* transcend the business world, they will turn out only to serve business interests.

Third, ultimately business ethics must find its chief place within the teaching of local churches, among business people and managers who find their basic moral identity there. Programs in businesses and in business schools can at best be allies.

The two classics on religion and business are M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, ET 1930; and R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, 1926. On the market system, democracy, and the business corporation, see C. E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, 1977; G. McConnell, *Private Government and American Democracy*, 1967; J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 1950. On stockholder responsibilities, see C. W. Powers, *Investments and Social Responsibility*, 1971. J. G. Simon, C. W. Powers, and J. P. Gun-

nemann. *The Ethical Investor*, 1972. At present writing the best selection of journal articles on business ethics, with an excellent bibliography, is T. Beauchamp and N. Bowie (eds.), *Ethical Theory and Business*, 1979.

JON P. GUNNEMANN

Calling see Vocation; see also Calvinist Ethics; Lutheran Ethics; Work, Doctrine of

Calvinist Ethics

For John Calvin (1509-1564), "the surest foundations of a well-regulated life" are in God's grace and our grateful response. "Ever since God exhibited himself to us as a Father, we must be convicted of extreme ingratitude if we do not in our turn exhibit ourselves as his sons" (*Institutes* 3.6.3). The Calvinist ethic is an ethic of grateful obedience* (see Gratitude).

Although "men cannot open their eyes without being compelled to see him" (1.5.1), and our consciences testify to his righteousness, yet our sinful corruption is such that a natural knowledge of God and of his law serves only to leave us without excuse. For although God's goodness is there before our eyes, we are so blinded by sin that we cannot see it. Therefore God gave the written law, which "removes the obscurity of the law of nature" (2.8.1).

In dealing with the law, Calvin, like Luther, draws much on Augustine (see Law and Gospel). The first use of the law is to lead us to Christ. It is a kind of mirror in which we see our iniquity (2.7.7). It leads us to implore the help of divine grace. "In the precepts of the Law, God is seen as the rewarder only of perfect righteousness . . . , but in Christ his countenance beams forth full of grace and gentleness towards poor unworthy sinners" (2.7.8). The second use of the law is to curb human violence and excess. "This forced and extorted righteousness is necessary for the good of society, its peace being procured by a provision but for which all things would be thrown into tumult and confusion" (2.7.10). This restraint is also a merciful provision for those who are not yet regenerate. In both these uses, the law is our schoolmaster. For Luther, these two, the spiritual and the civil, are the only uses of the law. For Calvin, the third use is the principal use, when believers "in whose hearts the Spirit of God already flourishes and reigns" find in the law a

teacher "to learn what that will of God is which they aspire to follow," and also a spur, a stimulus to encourage them (2.7.12).

Calvin denies that the law is totally abrogated. The curse of the law is certainly abrogated, for Christians are not under law, but under grace. The ceremonies of the Jewish religion are abrogated, as regards their use. But even the old ceremonial law still has a meaning, as pointing to Christ in whom it is fulfilled, and the moral law remains "a perfect rule of righteousness" (2.8.5), to show us that nothing is more acceptable to God than obedience. Calvin interprets the Ten Commandments in the light of the two great commandments, love to God and love to the neighbor, and regards the sayings of the Sermon on the Mount not as an addition to the commandments, but as their true interpretation.

Yet when he comes to speak of the Christian life, Calvin seems to set the law aside. "Although the law of God contains a perfect rule of conduct admirably arranged, it has seemed proper to our divine Master to train his people by a more accurate method, to the rule which is enjoined in the Law; and the leading principle in the method is, that it is the duty of believers to present their 'bodies a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable unto God, which is their reasonable service' (Rom. 12:1)" (3.7.1). This grateful self-offering to God, Calvin calls "self-denial."* "The Christian ought indeed to be so trained and disposed as to consider that during his whole life he has to do with God. . . . For he who has so learned to look to God in everything he does is at the same time diverted from all vain thoughts. This is . . . self-denial" (3.7.2). "We are not our own. . . . We are God's." These are the reiterated themes of self-denial.

Just as in his treatment of law Calvin holds together worship and ethics, love of God and love of the neighbor, as our grateful obedience, so self-denial has respect to God and to the neighbor. In regard to the neighbor it is that charity which seeks the neighbor's good, whoever he or she is, and is ready to share with that person our blessings. "Everyone should consider that however great he is, he owes himself to his neighbors, and that the only limit to his beneficence is the failure of his means" (3.7.7). But since human greed, self-seeking, and the dread of poverty spring from man's insecurity and fear, the principal part of self-denial has respect to God: that

discrimination" itself will not be acknowledged. To speak of such discrimination already presumes such a negative moral judgment and affirms the belief that males and females ought to be considered members of the same species so that the most basic universalizing criteria of morality apply. It is widely agreed that we should treat like cases alike, so rights and obligations predicated of one gender must be applicable to both if species commonality is assumed. Not all agree that the universalizability* intrinsic to the moral point of view applies to gender.

This normative diversity is paralleled by a range of empirical disagreements about the scope and manifestation of sex discrimination. Those whose normative convictions incline them to accept a broad range of difference in the treatment accorded men and women usually presume that manifestations of sex discrimination are rare. The burden of proof as to its existence falls on the claimant, since sex discrimination, in this view, exists only in infrequent situations where a woman of demonstrated equal or superior competence to a given male can be shown to have been the victim of conscious prejudice*. Those at the other end of the evaluative spectrum, who believe differential patterns of gender treatment are ethically and/or theologically dubious, see a different empirical reality. They believe that sex discrimination is widespread, and that its manifestations are subtle and self-perpetuating. They assume that justifications about gender difference as "natural," or divinely decreed, are ideological myths designed to perpetuate gender injustice, and that such rationales, when critically scrutinized, reveal assumptions of male supremacy.

Explicit ethical and theological debates about gender have become widespread only in the last two decades. In vast areas of the world this issue is now being raised for the first time. As a result, we may predict that ethical controversy regarding sex discrimination will escalate.

See Equality; Fairness; Feminist Ethics; Justice; Liberation Theology; Oppression; Respect for Persons; Women, Status of.

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BEVERLY WILDUNG HARRISON

Sexual Ethics

The traditional Judeo-Christian framework for evaluating sexual acts and relations is marriage*. The central purpose associated with sexual intercourse has been procreation*; procreation, sexuality, and marriage have been understood largely in terms of the welfare of societies rather than individuals, i.e., of familial, tribal, national, and religious communities. The ideal sexual act has been defined as heterosexual, potentially procreative, and expressive of the permanent, monogamous relationship which facilitates nurture of children and domestic and social stability.

Post-Reformation, especially post-Enlightenment, Western Christianity stresses the value and subjective experience of the individual, and construes the importance of individuals as on a par with that of society. The consequences for ethics, especially sexual ethics, have been significant. Personal fulfillment and interpersonal relationship have become preeminent criteria of sexual morality; marriage and procreation are evaluated in relation to these goals. The extent of this shift may be gauged by the degree to which the influence of five norms of sexual activity has varied in Christian tradition and its biblical precedents. Three of these norms regard the normative purposes of sexual activity: (1) procreation; (2) satisfaction of sexual desire or drives; (3) expression of a positive affective relation between the partners (love). Two additional criteria regard the normative relation within which these purposes may be met: (4) marital commitment, usually permanent and exclusive; (5) heterosexuality. The partnership of persons of opposite sex is an implicit precondition of procreative marriage; the heterosexual norm

comes into question in proportion to a decline in emphasis on procreation and a rise in emphasis on interpersonal sexual communion and pleasure.

The Bible is the universal and fundamental source of specifically *Christian* ethics. The OT (Hebrew Bible) presents procreative marriage as the norm (see *Old Testament Ethics*). The accounts of the creation of humanity in Gen. 1-3 construe sexual differentiation as part of God's design, as good, and as ordained not only to reproduction (1:26-28) but also to personal and social partnership (2:18-25). They portray an original equality of male and female, ruined by disobedience and sin (Gen. 3, esp. vs. 16-19). The egalitarian thrust of Gen. 1-3, however, is reflected consistently neither by the patriarchal social organization of ancient Israel nor by the biblical materials as a body, in which most central figures are male. Marriage in Israel occasionally was polygamous (polygynous) until about the time of the monarchy in the 10th century B.C. (Gen. 29:21-30; 2 Sam. 5:13-16; 1 Kings 11:1, 3); it was accompanied by concubinage (Gen. 16:1-4; 30:1-13) and levirate marriage (Gen. 38:8; Deut. 25:5-10), which augmented the production of heirs; and marriage could be dissolved by divorce at the husband's initiative (Deut. 24:1-4; but cf. Mal. 2:14-16). Sex outside of marriage was prohibited, more stringently for women. Females were regarded as under the absolute authority of, if not as the property of, husband or (if unmarried) father. The penalty for adultery was death for both partners (Lev. 20:10; Deut. 22:22; cf. Ex. 20:14; Lev. 18:20; Deut. 5:18). A betrothed virgin was considered as a wife; if convicted of intercourse, she escaped death only if the act took place in a rural area where demonstrably she would have been unable to call for help (Deut. 22:23-27). If a man had intercourse with an unbetrothed virgin, he was required to marry her and pay the bride price to her father (Deut. 22:28-29). Although prostitution* was not punishable by law, the man was warned against it (Prov. 5; 7:5, 25-27). Homosexual acts were forbidden (Lev. 18:22; 20:13), and bestiality was punishable by death for both men and women (Ex. 22:19; Lev. 18:23; 20:15-16). Also prohibited were incest*, nakedness, and sexual intercourse during menstruation (Lev. 20:11-12, 14, 17-21). Despite this generally patriarchal framework, prominent women are commemorated

in the biblical literature, e.g., Rebekah, Sarah, Rachel, Leah, Zipporah, Deborah, Naomi, Ruth, Abigail, and Judith (cf. Prov. 31:3-31). A counterpoint to the procreative focus is the Song of Solomon (Song of Songs), in which the tender, passionate eroticism of lovers is portrayed with no reference to procreation or even to marriage.

In the NT the importance of kinship, marriage, and the production of children is relativized by the eschatological horizon and gospel universality of primitive Christianity. In neither Testament is specific sexual morality a major concern; sexuality always is seen in relation to the nature and call of the people of God, and to the sort of faith and obedience that ought to characterize its members. Marriage is by no means forbidden; but one's relation to God and to the community of believers no longer depends on marital, familial, or racial ties (Matt. 10:37, 12:46-50; Mark 3:31-35; 10:29-30; Luke 8:19-21; 14:26). Marriage and family are background to many of Jesus' teachings and deeds, and he evidently concurs that adultery is wrong (Matt. 5:27-28; John 8:3-11). He repudiates the Jewish practice of divorce (Matt. 5:31-32; 19:9; Mark 10:11-12; Luke 16:18; 1 Cor. 7:10-11) in the name of the "one flesh" unity of man and woman established at the creation (Matt. 19:3-8; Mark 10:2-9), and insists that both wife and husband are obligated to fidelity*. The major theme of Jesus' teaching, however, is not morality, but conversion to the kingdom through repentance (Mark 1:14-15).

The only extended discussion of sexual ethics in the NT occurs in 1 Cor. 7. There Paul (see *Pauline Ethics*) sees the primary purpose of marriage as the legitimate satisfaction of sexual passion (vs. 2, 9, 36-37). Procreation is not a particular objective of the Christian community, not only because membership is not dependent on it, but also because the end of the world and the fulfillment of the reign of God are anticipated in the present generation (vs. 26, 29, 31b). As far as Paul is concerned, sexual activity and marriage only distract from preparation for the kingdom (vs. 32-35). Nor is the cultivation of one-to-one interpersonal affective relationships a priority for Paul, since, like the Hebrew tradition, he gauges all aspects of human life by their contribution to the community of faith. In the NT this means enhancement of cooperation a

General Notes

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The second part will deal with the years from 1800 to 1820, when the United States was still a young nation.

The third part will deal with the years from 1820 to 1840, when the United States was still a young nation.

The fourth part will deal with the years from 1840 to 1860, when the United States was still a young nation.

The fifth part will deal with the years from 1860 to 1876, when the United States was still a young nation.

The sixth part will deal with the years from 1876 to 1890, when the United States was still a young nation.

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worship, service, and witness (1 Cor. 12-14).

One striking dissimilarity to the Hebrew view is Paul's clear preference for celibacy* over marriage (1 Cor. 7:7-8, 38-40) since the unmarried state better facilitates "undivided devotion to the Lord" (v. 35). Paul rejects all "sexual immorality" (*porneia*), including fornication (1 Cor. 5:19; Eph. 5:3-5), prostitution (1 Cor. 6:15-16), adultery (6:9), incest (5:1), and homosexual acts (Rom. 1:26-27; 1 Cor. 6:9). One reason for exclusion of sexual communication and shared enjoyment as positive reasons for sexual intercourse in the NT and early Christianity (in contrast to the Song of Solomon) is the influence of Greek and Roman Stoic philosophy. The Stoic aim was to subordinate emotions and passions to rational ends, or even to rise above passion completely. Primitive Christianity appropriated Stoic themes while trying to counteract the Hellenistic Gnostic view that the material world is evil, that the body is the prison of the soul, and that procreation merely perpetuates imprisonment of souls. Christianity affirmed, against the Gnostics, the created goodness of the body, sex, marriage, and the bearing of children; but, with Stoicism, it set procreation as the only end that justifies sexual passion (see Gnosticism, Ethics of; Stoic Ethics).

In the patristic period, in medieval Christianity, and up to the Reformation, the central sexual norms remain constant: celibacy is valued highly as a witness to the coming kingdom, but is not mandatory; sexual activity, a secondary good, is justified completely only by intending procreation, and should be carried out in a heterosexual, monogamous, and permanent relationship. To seek marital intercourse to release sexual tension or to experience pleasure was not commended but tolerated; the petitioned spouse was enjoined to comply, i.e., to "render the debt" (cf. 1 Cor. 7:3-4). Early Christian views of the positive value of marriage seem to vary in inverse proportion to the urgency of eschatological expectation (see Patristic Ethics). The Latin father Tertullian (c. 160-c. 225), who looks for an imminent second coming of Christ, exalts virginity* and celibacy within marriage, counseling the avoidance of second marriages (*To His Wife*). An extreme form of this ascetic, rigorist strain was Montanism, defined by the church as heretical, but with which Tertullian eventually identified himself, renouncing marriage entirely for all

Christians. On the other hand, Tertullian's Greek contemporary Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-c. 215) agrees that continence* is better than sexual relations, but much more decisively affirms that marriage is instituted by God as part of the good of creation (*On Marriage*). Certainly the patristic figure who most set the parameters of Christian sexual ethics was Augustine (354-430), bishop of Hippo in North Africa (see Augustinian Ethics). Although he, too, sees virginity or continence as higher, he resists the Manichean doctrine (see Manichean Ethics) that matter is evil, and defines the purpose of sexual union as procreation. Marriage, the context of legitimate sex, has three purposes: children (*proles*), fidelity and the avoidance of fornication (*fides*), and the indissoluble and sacramental bond of Christian spouses (*sacramentum*). Augustine also speaks of companionship between the sexes. Although sexual intercourse was created good, Augustine seems convinced that after the fall of Adam and Eve it always is tainted by sin. He believes that the rational faculty ought to dominate the passions and control the body. Since intercourse does not take place by a sheer act of the rational will but involves involuntary bodily sensations and movements, Augustine thinks that it inevitably occasions the disordered ascendancy of passion over rational volition, and therefore is concupiscent (see Concupiscence). His ambivalence toward sexuality is demonstrated particularly in his occasional suggestions that original sin* is transmitted physically through intercourse to offspring (see especially *On the Good of Marriage*).

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274), the medieval Dominican, synthesized Christian teaching (including Augustine's) with Aristotle's philosophy (see Thomistic Ethics). His ethics rests on the premise that God has created a hierarchy of beings with distinct "natures" or intrinsic principles of existence and activity. Human nature is distinguished by intelligence and free will; these faculties as well as the physical structure of the human person form the criteria of moral responsibility. Thomas's view of sexual acts is informed both by the traditional enumeration of Augustine's three "goods" and by the Roman jurist Ulpian's emphasis on the moral implications of aspects of human nature shared with other animals, e.g., the procreative design of copulation. While Thomas con-

curs with the tradition that permanent, monogamous, procreative, and patriarchal marriage realizes the natural and normative meaning of sexual acts and relations, he expands Augustine's perspective by drawing attention to the friendship and intensity of love that should exist between spouses. He nowhere suggests that the passions or sexual desire are intrinsically sinful, or that they need override rational ends (ST II-II.26.11; 151-154; and *Supplement to the ST* 41-68).

The Protestant Reformation challenged the medieval tradition in sexual ethics. Most radically, Martin Luther (1483-1546) insists that marriage is an "estate" to which God has ordained most Christians (see *Lutheran Ethics; Orders*). Because the gift of celibacy is given rarely, mandating it for clergy and religious had resulted, observed Luther, in widespread abuse. Resolving to test all doctrine by Scripture, Luther grounds the meaning of sexuality in the Bible. On his reading of Genesis, he teaches that although male and female were created equal, through sin woman has fallen into submission, and man into debilitating toil. Woman, he claims, regains some of her original status through motherhood. Augustine's influence on Luther is strong; Luther retains procreation as the sole complete justification of sexual intercourse, and he manifests ambivalence regarding sexual desire, even when directed to procreation. In general, however, Luther has high praise for the vocations of marriage and parenthood. He also denies that marriage, one of the earthly callings, is a sacrament and he permits divorce in extreme cases. (See *Lectures on Genesis* and *On the Estate of Marriage*.) Appreciation of the companionship of wife and husband is more evident in the writings of John Calvin (1509-1564). (See *Calvinist Ethics*.) Procreation remains the purpose of sexual intercourse, but since Calvin emphasizes human sociality, he identifies the sacredness of the conjugal bond with the unity of husband and wife in body and soul. Marital intercourse is in itself holy and is no sin for married believers. Inability to remain continent becomes a motive for marriage only after the Fall. Although the woman is partner and helper, she always is subordinate to her husband. Even before their sin, Eve was subject to Adam; but subjection is compounded as a penalty for sin (see Calvin's *Commentaries* on Genesis 3 and 1 Corinthians 7; and *Institutes* 2.7). In general, the Re-

formers elevate marriage to a vocation* of service to God, church, and society. This is particularly clear in Anglicanism (see *Anglican Moral Theology*) and in manifestations of the Reformed (Calvinist) tradition such as Puritanism (see *Puritan Ethics*). By taking away the sacramental status of matrimony, thus removing it from the purview of ecclesiastical regulation, they make its institutionalization a civil affair and tend to make its morality more private.

Twentieth-century Protestant ethics has reinforced biblical origins, lifting up the norm of love and generally relying on individuals' perceptions of the sorts of acts which embody that norm. The most obvious exception is fundamentalist biblicism, which sees scripture as the source of definite and absolute moral rules. Mainstream Protestant bodies have guided believers with the reports of church-sponsored committees, usually not promulgated as law. The Roman Catholic Church differs by virtue both of its commitment to the natural law* and of its univocal teaching office (the magisterium*). (See *Modern Roman Catholic Moral Theology*.) Protestantism places less emphasis on procreation and more on acceptance of nonmarital sexual acts; Catholicism continues to insist, at least officially, that sex take place within marriage, undeterred from procreation by artificial contraception*. Orthodox Christianity, premised on Scripture and the church fathers, affirms marriage as the sole legitimate context of sex, but some authorities permit the contraceptive spacing of births (see *Eastern Orthodox Christian Ethics*). Christianity recently has been the object of feminist critiques of its support of the patriarchal institutionalization of sexuality and procreation. In response, growing attention has been directed in the churches to past bases of subordination of women and sexist interpretations of sexuality; to recovering biblical warrants for the equality of men and women; and to fostering reciprocal and egalitarian views of sexuality and male-female cooperation (see *Feminist Ethics; Women, Status of*).

Contemporary Christian sexual ethics in general gives more emphasis to love as a norm, and less to procreation. In the light of post-Freudian psychology, sexuality is seen as a profound stratum of the personality, not to be equated with genital activity. The ability to experience sexual desire and pleasure is

seen as a positive good and an avenue of love and commitment. This emphasis on the affective and enjoyable aspects of sex has had implications for moral criteria. Procreation is widely seen as valuable but not essential. Marriage continues to be affirmed as the normative or ideal context for sex, and certainly for procreation, by most Christian bodies and authors, but some justify pre- or extramarital sex that expresses love. Sexual interactions previously considered deviant or unnatural because not apt for procreation are judged by the same criteria of love and mutual pleasure. To the extent that the affective and interpersonal dimensions of sex have replaced procreation and marriage as its morally definitive criteria, it has become possible to reevaluate previously condemned sexual expressions, e.g., homosexual relations. Since recent empirical research suggests that the bases of sexual orientation lie beyond individual choice, both Catholicism and major Protestant denominations have ceased to define the homosexual orientation (same-sex preference) as in itself sinful, though some (including the Catholic Church) view it as abnormal or as a "sickness." Catholicism encourages the homosexual person to remain celibate, though with pastoral understanding of the difficulty. Some revisionist thinkers see loving homosexual relations and acts as intrinsically no less valuable than heterosexual ones.

Warrants supporting an affective norm in sexual ethics are the centrality of love in the NT, the inclusivity and personalism of the teaching of Jesus, and the influence of cultural presuppositions on biblical texts condemning adultery, fornication, and homosexuality. Natural law revisionists argue that human "nature" is rational, affective, and volitional, i.e., *personal*, not merely biological. Concrete acts must be placed in the context of personal relations before their morality can be evaluated. Countercritiques of these modifications see in them the pursuit of individual fulfillment to the denigration of moral continuity and of social responsibility; a new dualism that separates the personal, affective dimension from the physical dimension of sex (which is reproductive as well as physically pleasurable); insufficient attention to the fundamental heterosexual and monogamous ideal of Bible and tradition; and neglect, in interpreting sexual experience, of the Christian understanding of original sin's radical effects on the good creation.

See Abortion; Asceticism; Body; Celibacy; Chastity; Children; Continence; Contraception; Divorce; Embodiment; Family; Fidelity; Homosexuality; Lesbianism; Lust; Marriage; Masturbation; Monogamy; Morality, Legal Enforcement of; Original Sin; Polygamy; Procreation; Prostitution; Rape; Reproductive Technologies; Self-Realization; Temperance; Virginity; Vocation.

O. J. Babb, "Marriage," "Sex," "Woman," *IDB* III, IV, 1962; D. S. Bailey, *Sexual Relation in Christian Thought*, 1959 (also titled *Man-Woman Relation in Christian Thought*); J. Dominian, *Proposals for a New Sexual Ethic*, 1977; M. A. Farley, "Sexual Ethics," *EB*, 1978; H. Thielicke, *The Ethics of Sex*, ET 1964.

LISA SOWLE CAHILL

Shame

The word "shame" denotes a feeling or emotion that agents sometimes experience after wrong or bad actions. According to John Rawls's valuable analysis of shame, it is the feeling that a person has when experiencing damage to his or her self-respect or self-esteem. How is shame distinguished from and related to guilt? The distinction is not found in sensations but in the types of explanations offered for the feelings. If we distinguish natural shame from moral shame, the latter is explained by moral concepts. The moral concepts that explain shame and guilt come, roughly, from different parts of morality. As Rawls notes, "In general, guilt, resentment, and indignation invoke the concept of right, whereas shame, contempt, and derision appeal to the concept of goodness." In short, moral shame involves aspiration*, ideals, and supererogation*—forms of moral excellence* and goodness* that the agent attempts to attain. People who feel guilty invoke moral concepts of right and wrong* and expect their victims to be resentful and observers to be indignant; their "guilt is relieved by reparation, and the forgiveness* that permits reconciliation*." People who feel shame, or are ashamed, invoke an ideal, such as self-control, expect others to feel contempt for their shortcomings, and overcome the feeling of shame for their failures by improving in the future. Of course, the same act may evoke feelings of both guilt and shame; for example, a person may feel ashamed of a failure to control his or her anger* and guilty for

densome life. Among churches that single out abortion for the sake of avoiding the birth of a defective fetus are the Episcopal Church, the Lutheran Church in America, and the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).

What divides Christians is a different conception of marriage as a covenant*. The difference may be illustrated by comparing two current views; that of Pope John Paul II and that adopted by the 195th General Assembly (1983) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).

In his apostolic exhortation *Familiaris Consortio* (1981), Pope John Paul II portrays the marital covenant as a God-given capacity and vocation of each person to love and be loved. God's own love is exhibited in initiating a "personal loving communion," by creating and sustaining the human race in the divine image. Through these actions, God has "inscribed in the humanity of man and woman the vocation, and thus the capacity and responsibility, of love and communion." This love in marriage entails, then, at once a responsibility for sustaining the human race and personal communion. Human beings, without qualification, bear God's image (see *Image of God*). Each life is a blessing to be welcomed. Some Protestant bodies and individuals also portray the marital covenant in this way.

In "Covenant and Creation," a 1983 policy statement of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) on contraception and abortion, marriage is also described as a covenant with God. Pope John Paul II would agree with these Presbyterians that courage, love, patience, and strength are called for in bearing children, as well as the economic and spiritual resources to nurture a human life. The parting of the ways comes when the termination of pregnancy is said to be "an affirmation of one's covenant responsibility." This may occur in two instances: when the fetus is diagnosed as defective; and when resources are considered inadequate to care for a child appropriately. From the papal perspective, any failure to welcome these pregnancies and subsequent births would be a break in a covenant established not solely by parental decision but by divine activity. Furthermore, the Presbyterian document "Covenant and Creation" states that making a decision about abortion is a woman's decision and should be a legal right. Once again there is a parting of the ways: the papacy regards men and women as equally responsible for

procreation and protecting human life at every stage. Not all Catholics agree with the papal view; not all Protestants agree with the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).

Characteristically, church bodies and Christian ethicists are united, however, in calling for the churches, its members, and, to some extent, governmental agencies, to provide support, financial and spiritual, for pregnant women and families in need of it. Feminists have provided leadership in these matters, both in the churches and the literature of Christian ethics. Christians are agreed that human beings should work for a world in which each child is treated as befits a gift or blessing of God.

See Abortion; Children; Contraception; Family; Feminist Ethics; Freedom; Life, Sacredness of; Marriage; Parenthood; Population Policy; Responsibility; Sex Discrimination; Sexual Ethics; Sterilization; Women, Status of.

M. A. Farley, "Sexual Ethics," *EB*, 1978; B. W. Harrison, *Our Right to Choose*, 1983; J. T. McHugh, *A Theological Perspective on Natural Family Planning*, 1983; P. Ramsey, *Fabricated Man*, 1970; W. Yates, "Population Ethics: Protestant Perspectives," in *EB*, 1978.

VALERIE DEMARINIS/ARTHUR J. DYCK

Professional Associations

see Trade Unions and Professional Associations; see also Codes of Ethics; Professional Ethics

Professional Ethics

A profession is not only a way of making a living; it is the carrying out of an occupation to which standards of competence and responsibility are attached. Robert K. Merton has named the social values that make up the concept of a profession as: "First, the value placed upon systematic knowledge and the intellect: knowing. Second, the value placed upon technical skill and capacity: doing. And third, the value placed upon putting this conjoint knowledge and skill to work in the service of others: helping." A professional person is committed to maintaining standards. These are partly standards of competence; he or she will normally have been expected to have secured recognized qualifications for entry into the profession. They will also be standards of

"professional integrity." Professional ethics concern the particular kinds of conduct recognized as necessary to this integrity in the profession in question. In some cases, notably the medical profession, professional ethics form an explicit code, disregard of which can be a matter for disciplinary action on the part of the professional association. Social work in the UK, which is a grouping of various occupations, was given a professional code in 1975, based on an explicit value judgment: "the recognition of the value and dignity of every human being irrespective of origin, status, sex, sexual orientation, age, belief, or contribution to society," and it sets out consequential principles and conduct for the kinds of situation social workers are likely to meet. The National Association of Social Workers in the U.S.A. had formulated its professional code by 1960. The American Nurses' Association adopted its first code of ethics in 1950, and a comparison of that code with the 1976 revision reveals an altered conception of the profession, particularly in its movement away from obedience to the physician to responsibility to the patient.

The earliest known instance of a "professional code" is the Hippocratic Oath*, probably of the 4th century B.C.:

I will look upon him who shall have taught me this Art even as one of my parents. I will share my substance with him, and I will supply his necessities, if he be in need. I will regard his offspring even as my own brethren, and I will teach them this Art, if they would learn it, without fee or covenant. I will impart this Art by precept, by lecture and by every mode of teaching, not only to my own sons but to the sons of him who has taught me, and to disciples bound by covenant and oath, according to the Law of Medicine.

The regimen I adopt shall be for the benefit of my patients according to my ability and judgment, and not for their hurt or for any wrong. I will give no deadly drug to any, though it be asked of me, nor will I counsel such, and especially I will not aid a woman to procure abortion. Whatsoever house I enter, there will I go for the benefit of the sick, refraining from all wrongdoing or corruption, and especially from any act of seduction, of male or female, of bond or free. Whatso-

ever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting such things to be as sacred secrets.

The Hippocratic Oath is still read to medical students when they receive instruction in medical ethics in the course of their training. This code emphasizes the need to maintain a relationship of confidence between doctor and patient; the patient must be sure that the doctor will respect information given him or her in the course of professional service. This is analogous to the "seal of the confessional" between priest and penitent, whereby a priest is bound not to divulge what he hears in confession. (In this case there are sacramental as well as ethical reasons, since the priest is looked on as instrumental in the relation between the penitent and God.) In some countries these communications are "privileged," that is, the recipient is not bound to disclose them in a court of law under threat of contempt of court if he or she refuses. Communications between lawyers and their clients are privileged. The reasons for this were given by L. J. Knight-Bruce, in *Pearse v. Pearse* (1846), *De Gex and Sm.* 28.29:

Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely—may be pursued too keenly—may cost too much. And surely the meanness and the mischief of prying into a man's confidential consultations with his legal adviser, the general evil of infusing evil and dissimulation, uneasiness, suspicion and fear into those communications which must take place, and which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay for truth itself.

This pronouncement throws light on the general character of professional ethics. Professional ethics do not concern the general obligations of human beings to other human beings as such, but canalize certain of these obligations in relation to the functional requirements of carrying out a particular kind of service. They formulate the sort of conduct needed if the relation between the professional person and his or her client is to be such that the work in which they are both interested can be done. The relation between the professional person and the client is, how-

A close-up photograph of a circular hole in a light-colored, textured wall. The hole is dark, suggesting it leads to a cavity or a dark space behind the wall. The wall surface appears slightly rough or aged.

ever, only one of the role relationships in which the former is professionally concerned. There are also relationships to colleagues, and relations as a professional person to the lay public. Thus, though lawyers or barristers are under an obligation not to divulge communications between themselves and their clients, they also have a duty to the court and to the cause of justice. While their duty is to put the best interpretation on the evidence in the interest of the client, they must not deceive the court by making a statement they know to be false. Professional ethics as between colleagues are intended as means of maintaining mutual trust and collaboration within the profession. They often prescribe that professional persons shall not advertise their services, shall not entice clients from another practitioner, and shall be ready to help a colleague in case of need. Some of these matters are questions of "professional etiquette"; the borderline between etiquette and ethics is, however, not easy to draw.

An important part of professional ethics is concerned with the maintenance of what Talcott Parsons called "affective neutrality." Some personal relations are such that affections and emotion enter into them in a particular and intimate way. The relation between husband and wife is an outstanding case in point. Professional relationships are best served where professionals can achieve a certain emotional detachment while at the same time being genuinely concerned to help their clients. This does not mean they need be "cold fish"; it means they must avoid the kind of emotional involvement that could cloud their judgment; and while they may not be able to avoid liking some of their clients better than others, they must not let this be a reason for giving them preferential treatment. A sexual relationship between a doctor and a patient can be a matter for disciplinary action and for striking the doctor's name off the register. Psychoanalysts in particular have had to give careful thought to the ethical restraints necessary in the "transference" situation, where an emotional attitude on the patient's part has to be allowed temporarily for therapeutic reasons.

A professional code can therefore be presented as a form of functional role morality, designed to promote the kind of relationships within which a required service can best be carried out. Beyond this, the behavior so en-

joined also becomes valued on its own account, as a matter of professional integrity, and adds to the respect with which professional persons are regarded in the community. Professional ethics are therefore concerned not only with relations with clients, colleagues, and members of the public but also with maintaining the public image of the profession. In the case of the established professions in particular, professional ethics are preeminently conservative in the non-party sense of conserving the moral and intellectual traditions of the profession, and also in the sense of being administered by what tends to be a conservative hierarchy not always sensitive to new social conditions. Nevertheless, they can represent a tradition of careful thought and experience concerning certain specific problems that a practitioner is likely to meet in the course of his or her work. They thus protect against certain kinds of pressure—for instance, the pressure to use professional influence in a "nepotist" way to secure jobs for relations and friends whose qualifications may not be equal to those of other candidates, and above all, against the pressure to divulge confidential information. The work of a professional person, especially perhaps that of a doctor, gives rise to a large number of often very difficult problems for moral decisions. That the lines for guidance on some of the more typically recurrent of these problems have been laid down in a person's professional ethics is not likely to mean that the individual's own powers of moral judgment need go unexercised, or that he or she need not acquire skill and sensitivity in personal relationships.

See Applied Ethics; Bioethics; Business Ethics; Codes of Ethics; Confidentiality; Hippocratic Oath; Medical Ethics.

W. W. Boulton, *A Guide to Conduct and Etiquette at the Bar of England and Wales*, 1953; A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The Professions*, 1933; *Code of Ethics for Social Work* (1975) by British Association of Social Workers; A. Etzioni, *The Semi-Professions*, 1969, ch. on "Social Work as a Semi-Profession"; A. Jameton, *Nursing Practice: The Ethical Issues*, 1984; R. K. Merton, *Some Thoughts on the Professions in American Society*, 1960; T. Parsons, *Essays on Sociological Theory*, 1949, ch. 8. "The Professions and Social Structure."

DOROTHY L. MORTON

notoriously difficult to determine in some cases. The Christian value of being responsible is perhaps the one most amenable to service by many of the new behavior controls. The legitimacy and limits of self-control and social control in some cases can be articulated by a determination of whether the intervention leads to greater responsibility in the person being controlled and in relevant others. But greater responsibility is not the only justification for behavior control. Psalm 104:15 praises God for wine, which merely gladdens the heart.

See also *Autonomy; Free Will and Determinism; Morality, Legal Enforcement of; Paternalism; Persons and Personality; Responsibility.*

J. Feinberg and R. Neville, "Behavior Control," *EB* I, 1978; W. Gaylin et al., *Operating on the Mind*, 1975; E. Goffman, *Asylums*, 1961; G. Klerman et al., "Controlling Behavior Through Drugs," *Hastings Center Studies* 2, no. 1, Jan. 1974; P. London, *Behavior Control*, 1969; R. Macklin and W. Gaylin, *Mental Retardation and Sterilization: A Problem of Competency and Paternalism*, 1981.

ROBERT C. NEVILLE

Behaviorism

Behaviorism is the doctrine that utterances about psychological or mental states are ultimately reducible to, or should be replaced by, expressions about an organism's dispositions to behave in certain ways. The acknowledged father of this doctrine is the American psychologist J. B. Watson (1878–1958), its most famous recent defender being B. F. Skinner (b. 1904). The classic statement of philosophical behaviorism is Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* (1949), which is directed against the Cartesian view that "inner states" are immediately known, essentially private, and capable of causing dispositions to behave without being dispositions themselves. Against this view, Ryle aimed to establish a conceptual connection between reports of inner states and behavioral dispositions, thereby vindicating the doctrine of behaviorism. Ryle's opposition to the Cartesian view of "inner states" has been widely influential. Philosophers have grown increasingly doubtful, however, that talk about "inner states" can be reduced to talk about dispositions—a claim that many now take to be an overreaction to Cartesianism. Some philosophers, in-

fluenced especially by the arguments of W. V. Quine (b. 1908), have tried to recast the case against Cartesianism without claiming to establish conceptual connections. Cartesianism and behaviorism are now often described as extreme positions that do not exhaust the alternatives.

G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949; J. B. Watson, *Behaviorism*, 1924.

JEFFREY STOUT

Beneficence

Beneficence is active well-doing. Christian ethics recognizes a duty to do good to the neighbor and even to the enemy, but almost all ethical theories, religious or secular, teach a duty of beneficence.

See *Altruism; Love.*

JOHN MACQUARRIE

Benevolence

Benevolence is an attitude of goodwill, and may be considered as the subjective disposition corresponding to the activity of beneficence*.

JOHN MACQUARRIE

Bible in Christian Ethics

An early Paulinist confidently declared that scripture is "profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness" (2 Tim. 3:16). Since that time the same declaration has echoed down the centuries and across the divisions of the Christian church—and with reference to the NT as well as the Hebrew scriptures. Christian churches have always considered it a part of their calling to teach, reprove, correct, and train in righteousness, and they have always considered the Bible "profitable" for that task. With virtually one voice the churches have declared that the Bible is an authority for moral discernment and judgment. And Christian ethicists—at least those who consider their work part of the common life of the Christian community—have shared this affirmation.

That single voice, however, becomes many voices when scripture is *used* as an authority*. To affirm the authority of scripture is to invoke the use of the Bible in moral discernment and judgment, but it is not to prescribe how the Bible is to be used. The use of scripture or the authorizations for moving in argument from the Bible to contemporary moral

claims depend not just on scripture's authority, but on judgments (sometimes left implicit) about its nature and message, the questions appropriate to it, and the relevance of other sources of moral wisdom.

What are these writings? One important debate relevant to the use of scripture in Christian ethics concerns its nature. The Bible did not fall directly from heaven; all Christians acknowledge and affirm that the Bible is human words. But these human words have been heard in the churches and are acclaimed in the churches as the word of God. The Bible is both human words and the word of God.

The conjunction of the divine and the human—whether in Jesus of Nazareth or the sacraments or scripture—eludes precision. At the Council of Chalcedon (451) the church was content to make a series of limiting statements concerning the way divine and human were joined in Christ: The divine and the human must not be confused, transmuted the one into the other, divided into separate categories, or contrasted according to area or function.

This Chalcedonian perspective can also be applied to scripture and distinguished from the perspective of fundamentalism*, which identifies and confuses the human words of scripture with the divine word, transmuting the one into the other; and from the perspective of liberalism, which divides the two and contrasts the human words with the divine word.

Fundamentalism's identification of the human words of scripture with the word of God has justified an identification of biblical ethics with Christian ethics. A rule or command or any moral teaching found in scripture may be presumed to be normative for the church today. The presumption typically may be overridden if the rule or command was intended as a temporary obligation rather than a perpetual obligation. The tasks of Christian ethics are to harmonize, systematize, and apply the biblical ethic.

Liberalism's contrast of the human words of scripture with the divine word has sometimes justified the "liberation" of Christian ethics from the human words of scripture. When scripture is used, the authorization is that some of its moral teaching expresses the word of God as that has been independently identified. The tasks of Christian ethics are to

identify the word of God within scripture (e.g., the social idealism of Jesus or the law of love) and to articulate it in a contemporary way. The task of identifying the word of God, moreover, is undertaken by attending carefully to contemporary needs and problems, to the Spirit of God in the age, not particularly to the human words of scripture.

A Chalcedonian perspective will be appreciative of fundamentalism's concern to bind the church to the Bible, and will be appreciative of liberalism's concern to address contemporary issues and problems. But it will disown fundamentalism's identification of the human words of scripture with the divine word, and also liberalism's contrast of the human words with the Word of God. It will disown not only these judgments about scripture but also the authorizations for the use of scripture that rest on them. It will own the "important two-part consensus," identified by Birch and Rasmussen (pp. 45–46) that "Christian ethics is not synonymous with biblical ethics" and that "for Christian ethics the Bible is somehow normative." A Chalcedonian perspective does not entail any particular recommendation for the use of scripture, but it does rule out some uses, and it invites further reflection concerning the other methodologically significant questions.

What questions are appropriate to the Bible? The use of the Bible in Christian ethics depends in part on judgments about the questions appropriate to it. Two issues may be distinguished here: the *type* of question judged appropriate, and the *level* of moral inquiry at which scripture is thought to speak with authority.

With respect to the type of question judged appropriate, some enduring disputes in Christian ethics are reflected. Some see moral agency as responsibility to God, and scripture as addressing questions of God's character and work. On this model, theological questions rather than moral questions are judged appropriate; indeed, scripture's rules or moral principles may be judged to be quaint. Others, however, insist that explicitly moral questions are appropriate, that our responsibility to God is shaped and judged by scripture's moral teachings. The type of moral question judged appropriate to scripture still reflects judgments about moral agency: deontologists are likely to ask questions of duty or the right; teleologists are

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likely to ask questions of proper ends or the good; and virtue theorists are likely to ask questions of character (see *Deontology; Teleological Ethics; Virtue*).

Another enduring dispute in Christian ethics is reflected in whether questions concerning political or social ethics*, as well as questions of personal ethics*, are judged appropriate to scripture.

There is a growing consensus that it is inappropriate to expect scripture to address the sort of moral question that seems sometimes to monopolize ethical reflection in pluralistic societies, the question of an impartial and "autonomous" morality, a morality that obliges a person whatever (and in spite of, if need be) his or her moral commitments and communities. It is precisely the sort of questions from which an autonomous morality based on "impartial" reason prescinds that are particularly appropriate to scripture. The Bible claims our loyalty for God, gives us a community and a history, and requires integrity with that identity in our dispositions and intentions.

With respect to the level of moral discourse, all agree that the question "Why be moral?" is appropriate to scripture. Many insist that scripture also speaks with authority at the "ethical principle" level, where the question is, "What general principles are normative?" And some even claim that scripture speaks with authority at the "moral rule" level, where the question is the concrete one of conduct, "What ought I to do?" To ask this last question, however, comes perilously close to confusing the human words of scripture with the Word of God and to treating scripture as what it is not and did not intend to be, an eternal code. The scripture will and must continue to bear on the concrete decisions of Christians—not directly but, rather, in ways mediated by its response to inquiries concerning our moral identity, our fundamental loyalty and perspective, and the dispositions and intentions which inhere in that identity.

What is the message of the Bible? The question of what one understands when one understands scripture is not a new one, nor is the relevance of such judgments to the use of scripture in Christian ethics a recent discovery. Augustine candidly insisted that any movement from scripture to moral claims is licensed if and only if it is consistent with the

double love commandment, which he identified as the message of scripture.

Many Christian ethicists have claimed that Jesus Christ is the center of the biblical message in its entirety and the key to scripture. Then, of course, Christological "judgments" become relevant to the use of the Bible in ethics. If Jesus is understood as one who comes announcing the kingdom of God* as an ideal social order, then the use of scripture in moral argument will be authorized if and only if it is consistent with the social ideals of the kingdom (e.g., Walter Rauschenbusch). If Jesus is seen as teaching and embodying "a social style characterized by the creation of a new community and the rejection of violence" (J. H. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, p. 250), then the understanding and use of scripture must cohere with that vision. If Jesus is seen as the "transhistorical Christ" in whom Christians mysteriously participate, then even the use of Jesus' teachings will be limited and licensed by what can be apprehended of the mystery.

Some Christian ethicists prefer a more Trinitarian rendering of the message of scripture: What we understand when we understand scripture may be summarized in terms of creation, fall, redemption, and the future age. Both H. R. Niebuhr and Richard Mouw provide such a summary and use it to license and limit their use of scripture; they differ about the type and level of question appropriate to scripture, however, because they hold different views of scripture and of moral agency.

Currently a number of Christian ethicists, notably Third World theologians (e.g., Gustavo Gutiérrez, Rubem Alves), black theologians (e.g., James Cone), and feminist theologians (e.g., Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza), understand "liberation" or deliverance from oppression to be the message of scripture. What one understands when one understands scripture is a history of liberation, oriented toward the future, in which a contemporary praxis of liberation can and must participate. The use of scripture in contemporary morality is authorized if and only if the claims are consistent with the central theme of liberation. Critics of liberation theology (e.g., J. H. Yoder) have sometimes asked whether liberation does not need to be balanced or subordinated to other themes—whether, in effect, liberation really is the mes-

sage of scripture, and whether the understanding of "liberation" is controlled by the Bible or other sources (see *Afro-American Religious Ethics*; *Feminist Ethics*; *Liberation Theology*).

Examples of judgments about the message of scripture and their relevance to its use in Christian ethics could easily be multiplied. In the midst of this diversity three general observations can be made. First, judgments about the wholeness of scripture are methodologically necessary; Christian ethics would be served by candor about these judgments. Second, these judgments rest not so much on an "impartial" exegetical demonstration as on the experience of the authority of scripture in the context of one's own moral struggles, on the one hand, and of the believing community and its moral tradition, on the other. Third, the judgments about the message may not be substituted for the writings themselves. They may only be fashioned and used in the context of reverently listening to the whole Bible in the context of the believing community. Then the diverse judgments need not be ruled but may be appreciated, for they keep us attentive to the whole of scripture and to the whole believing community in our concern with and for the world.

What is the relevance of other sources? The use of scripture in Christian ethics finally also depends on judgments about the relevance of other sources of moral insight. Positions range from a theological veto on the contributions of other sources to the surrender of control over moral argument to other sources. Between these extremes there are many voices calling for some sort of dialogue between scripture and other sources.

The theological veto on the contributions of natural morality or philosophical ethics is sometimes represented as entailed by the Reformation slogan *Sola scriptura* and is usually based on the radical fallenness of human nature and all human projects, including the project of distinguishing good and evil (e.g., Jacques Ellul). Not only is there inconsistency in this position, but the dismissal of arguments based on reason alone is an *argumentum ad hominem* on the scale of an *argumentum ad humanum*.

The surrender of control over the formation of conscience* is a position that looks to the deliverances of an autonomous morality or of some ideology* (see also *Autonomy of Ethics*). Jack Sanders, for example, states

candidly that scripture "must not be allowed to stand in the way of what is humane and right" (*Ethics in the New Testament*, p. 130). Many liberation theologians charge that the understanding and use of scripture have been controlled by the ideological presuppositions of the powerful. They do not recommend as a remedy the model of impartial reason and value-free critical exegesis, which they take to be a deceptive pretense cloaking ideological control by the powerful. Rather, they recommend candid commitment to partiality for the poor and oppressed, to the interests of particular oppressed groups, and to a social analysis that stands in their service. And they would surrender control over the understanding and use of scripture to these other sources (thus Juan Luis Segundo, James Cone, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza; whereas José Miranda's recommended remedy is objective critical exegesis). However, to surrender control over Christian ethics to sources other than those intimately related to the religious community's moral identity—whether to the autonomous morality of impartial reason or to the ideologies of either the rich or the oppressed—comes perilously close to surrendering Christian identity.

Instead of the theological veto or the surrender of control to other sources, many have recommended some form of dialogue. The dialogue is understood and undertaken in various ways, of course. Sometimes the Bible's part in the dialogue is to challenge and disrupt conventional moral certainties and securities. Sometimes its role is to confirm and collaborate moral decisions reached on the basis of other sources. Sometimes scripture is taken to supplement or transform natural moral wisdom. Sometimes other sources challenge and disrupt a conventional understanding and use of scripture and force a new examination of what it requires of the believing community. The consensus, however, seems to be that—at least with respect to questions of moral identity—scripture must have the last word in the dialogue and that the biblically based identity must limit, corroborate, and transform appeals to reason and to group interests.

Conclusion. There is no "Christian ethics" that would deny the authority of the Bible, for apart from scripture the Christian church has no enduring identity. It must be recognized, however, that even those claims made on the basis of scripture are quite human

claims, arrived at by means of quite human authorization. The authority of scripture for Christian ethics does not license the religious pride of claiming the absolute view, the final word. God's truth about some hard case simply because we can appeal to scripture. Indeed, the authority of scripture (as well as the confession of human capacities for self-deception and rationalization) commits us to self-conscious and self-critical reflection about the authorizations we use in moving from scripture to moral claims. It calls us again and again to listen reverently to the whole canon in the midst of the whole believing community. In that way perhaps the God who bears toward us—in scripture and the community—the relation of sanctifier may cleanse and renew even our use of the Bible in Christian ethics.

See also **Christian Ethics**.

B. C. Birch and L. Rasmussen, *Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life*, 1976; C. E. Curran and R. A. McCormick, S.J. (eds.), *Readings in Moral Theology, No. 4: The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology*, 1984; T. W. Ogletree, *The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics*, 1983; A. Verhey, *The Great Reversal: Ethics and the New Testament*, 1984.

ALLEN VERHEY

Biblical Ethics see Jesus, Ethical Teaching of; Johannine Ethics; Mosaic Law; New Testament Ethics; Old Testament Ethics; Paul, Ethical Teaching of; Prophetic Ethics; Wisdom Literature, Ethics in; see also Bible in Christian Ethics

Bigamy

Marriage* to a second wife or husband while a previous marriage is in force. Bigamy is a crime in Western countries, though in other parts of the world bigamy or polygamy* (the marriage of many wives) is commonly practiced.

HERBERT WADDAMS

Bioethics

The term "bioethics" is very recent, one of its earliest uses being by V. R. Potter in *Bioethics: Bridge to the Future* (1971). He defined bioethics as "the science for survival" and concentrated on the use of the biological sciences to improve the quality of life. A more common definition of bioethics is the application of ethics to the biological

sciences, medicine, health care, and related areas as well as the public policies directed toward them. The *Encyclopedia of Bioethics* (1978) adopts this approach. Since the term "bioethics" may suggest an independent discipline rather than the application of ethics to an arena of human activity, parallel to other applications such as political ethics and business ethics, and since the term *bios* (meaning "life") is much too broad for what is treated under the heading of "bioethics," the phrase "biomedical ethics" has been proposed, but "bioethics" is handier and more common. Widespread interest in problems of bioethics dates from the late 1960s and early 1970s, when such developments as heart transplantation and the allocation of scarce lifesaving resources (e.g., dialysis machines) raised serious questions about what ought to be done. Judaism and Roman Catholicism have had stronger traditions of reflection on medical ethics than Protestantism, but Joseph Fletcher's *Morals and Medicine* (1954) was a landmark book, followed by Paul Ramsey's *The Patient as Person* (1970), which appeared as interest in bioethics exploded. Many other religious thinkers have contributed significantly to the field of bioethics, being joined for the last decade by numerous philosophers who have returned to applied ethics*. Bioethics is necessarily interdisciplinary and interprofessional, involving scientists, physicians, nurses, and others, as well as theologians and philosophers. For an indication of the range of problems covered in bioethics, see, e.g., Abortion; Death, Determination of; Euthanasia; Experimentation with Human Subjects; Genetics; Medical Ethics; Organ Transplantation; Reproductive Technologies; Science and Ethics.

T. L. Beauchamp and J. F. Childress, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*, 1983; *Dictionary of Medical Ethics*, ed. A. S. Duncan, G. R. Dunstan, and R. B. Welbourn, new rev. ed., 1981; *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, ed. W. T. Reich, 4 vols., 1978 (esp. D. Clouser, "Bioethics").

JAMES F. CHILDRESS

Biomedical Ethics see Bioethics; Medical Ethics; Professional Ethics

Birth Control see Contraception; Population Policy; Procreation; Sexual Ethics

is not perceived as creating a precedent for future application. In the next similar circumstance, the rule will again be applied with its full force and without reference to the previous exercise of Economy. Needless to say, only proper authority may exercise Economy (in most cases a bishop, a synod, or a spiritual father).

There is no accepted and universal pattern for the formulation of the norms of Eastern Orthodox ethical praxis. Often, they are articulated after the fashion of the NT in reference to occasional situations, or as broad generalities. Sometimes they are the fruits of deep meditation (e.g., the *Philokalia*). Frequently, these moral directives are given as the result of questions asked by the faithful, such as the so-called longer and shorter *Rules of Basil*. An ancient tradition that embodies the rules of behavior for the guidance of *pneumatichoi*, i.e., spiritual father confessor, in the *exomologetaria* (confessors' handbooks) also serves this purpose.

In the modern tradition of Eastern Orthodox ethics, it is frequent that the praxis of the church's ethical teaching is included in a second or "practical" part. The most common, though by no means exclusive, approach is to delineate the praxis of Eastern Orthodox ethics in reference to the "other" with whom we are in communion, i.e., God, neighbor, and self.

Concern for the neighbor is not limited to interpersonal relations. It also includes concern for nature and for the basic institutions of life, such as family, state, and church. As these reach farther and farther into the society and world which is "not church," the church looks for a model for society which is coherent with its basic Trinitarian orientation. It finds this model in the concept of the kingdom of God. The spheres of Orthodox Christian ethics, therefore, encompass the personal, the ecclesial, and the broadly social.

S. S. Harakas, *Contemporary Moral Issues Facing the Orthodox Christian*, 1982; and *Toward Transfigured Life: The "Theoria" of Orthodox Christian Ethics*, 1983.

STANLEY SAMUEL HARAKAS

Ecclesiology and Ethics

The term "ecclesiology" first appeared in the 19th century in studies of the architectural forms and decor appropriate in the structure

of church buildings. However, that question was quickly recognized as dependent on both theological and practical questions as to what the nature, purpose, patterns of authority and participation, boundaries and central values of the Christian community, the *ecclesia*, the company of believers, ought to be. Thus, the term "ecclesiology" was applied to the study of doctrines of the church, particularly as those doctrines take practical shape in institutional life. Wherever these studies turn to normative implications for establishing patterns of "right and good" behavior or structure for human community, ecclesiology is directly linked to ethics.

Nearly all theological studies of the organized Christian community acknowledge that the foundation of the church's existence is a mystery, a gift of grace. While familial, economic, political, cultural, and a number of other social institutions can be understood to be grounded, at least in part, on the needs or desires of humanity and society (see Institution), the community of faith cannot be so explained. Theological expositions of the foundations of the *ecclesia* thus focus on the interpretation of key images and symbols which attempt to identify the character of that grace-full mystery: body of Christ, covenant, communion of saints, people of God, temple of the Holy Spirit, etc. To be sure, an *ecclesia* is also an earthly institution, and even the most abstruse spiritual reflection on these symbols must sooner or later identify the "marks" of where these are truly present in the world. For early church leaders, and for many today, these marks are apostolicity, catholicity, unity, sacramentality, and obedience to the proper clergy in decisive matters of faith and morals. For the Reformation churches, the marks most often accented are "the gospel rightly preached and the sacraments rightly administered." Sectarian groups often focus on the marks of personal regeneration and righteous living. And throughout the long history of disputes on these matters, the water is widely muddied by ecclesiasticism—the attempt to prove that "our" church polity derives directly from the intentions of Jesus while everyone else's is tainted by nefarious pretenses of humanity's greed for power and authority.

The rich meanings implicit in these symbols and their marks have been spelled out by a range of modern scholars. Paul Minear, for example, systematically explicates the domi-

nant ecclesial images that can be found in scripture; F. W. Dillistone lays out the metaphysical, anthropological, and organizational assumptions of the "organic" as compared and contrasted with the "societal" symbols of the Anglo-Catholic and Reformed traditions; and A. Dulles has recently analyzed the eight competing models of the church that overlap in Catholic and some Protestant ecumenical understandings. These and other theologians have been clear that each of the understandings of the church has direct implications for the ways in which normative authority is to be understood and structured in the community of faith and how that community is to relate to the society in which it finds itself.

However important these treatments are for Christian ethics, the mainstream of ethical reflection on ecclesiology has been shaped by two other developments: One derives from pioneering work in the sociology of religion and ethics in the traditions of Max Weber and, especially, Ernst Troeltsch as carried on in America (especially) by students of Troeltsch: H. R. Niebuhr, J. L. Adams, J. Bennett, and W. G. Muelder, and their students. The other is the development of ecumenical structures in federations and councils of churches around the world.

Troeltsch and Weber argued that in the history of Christianity, two essential types of ecclesial organization had developed: the church* type and the sect* type. These are analytically derived constructs which serve as genus categories for the two predominant ways in which primary religious concerns can be organized and institutionalized in social and ethical life. In Christian history, each has many species, and there are numerous mixtures as well as inevitable influence from both the natural requirements of worldly life and the specific historical conditions in which the ecclesia finds itself. Each is marked by a coherent body of social attitudes and teachings about the organization of authority in the community of faith, and about the Christian's obligations in society. Indeed, each develops a distinctive way of legitimating or ignoring, reforming or passively accepting the ethical authority of civilization's structures and institutions. For this distinction, Troeltsch and Weber are justly famous.

But another level of their work is of equal import and less often noted: The main forms

of the Christian ecclesia in the past (the Catholic and the Calvinist) provided a core "religious social philosophy" by which Western civilizations found integrity and direction, and they did so by integrating the "highest" religious principles with the "base" demands of social existence into a guiding normative polity. Ecclesiology as polity is the center point at which theology and sociology join, and it is only at this juncture that profound and durable social teachings can give guidance to independent groups or to whole civilizations. (The "sects" are most concerned about the former, the "churches" about the latter.) Both Troeltsch and Weber express skepticism as to whether a fresh and compelling new synthesis can be developed, since old Catholicism and Calvinism have faded in influence. The reasons have to do with a simultaneous crisis of faith since the Enlightenment and the complexity of modern society since industrialization and massive urbanization, of which the fragmentation of the church is partly cause, partly effect, and partly symptom. Nevertheless, their work demonstrates that no ecclesial theory and hence no "Christian social philosophy" can be constructed simply on the basis of theological and religious elements alone; it is always an amalgam of religious, theological, and ethical first principles *in conjunction with* the intellectual, social, political, economic, and cultural resources present in the historical environment. Indeed, just as the building of cathedrals and chapels depends on the governing designs and ideals of the architects and engineers, it also depends on the kinds and qualities of building materials available and on the skills of ordinary craftsmen. Ecclesiology as normative social theory, i.e., as the attempt to incarnate in the real, historical world the kinds and qualities of worship (piety), human relations (polity), and programmatic actions (policies) which God wants of believers and for humanity, inevitably demands ever-new synthesis. Ecclesiology thus becomes the study of the dynamic and constantly transforming points of selective affinity, normatively ordered, between changing perceptions of the first principles of theology and religious ethics, on the one hand, and changing material conditions of civilization on the other. In the Troeltschian tradition, particularly, we find a historical-sociological-theological-ethical argument that the ecclesia is the incarnate moral

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of civilization and that its proper science, ecclesiology, is the fundamental clue to the social ethics of civilization.

As an example of those who have built their work on this tradition, one could cite the early works of H. R. Niebuhr. He showed, in one important study, the social influences on the formation of "denominations" derived from either "churches" or "sects" under specific social-economic pressures (1929). In another, he discusses the ways in which the symbol "Kingdom of God" has been variously interpreted in America to produce distinctive attitudes toward social and cultural materials to produce changing ecclesial and social-ethical structures (1937). And in a third, he traced the predominant logics by which the theological-ethical principles (summarized by the word "Christ") could be related to sociopolitical and intellectual ones ("culture") (1951). James Luther Adams, to mention another example, took the concerns of Troeltsch, as modified by Paul Tillich's theology of culture and "liberal" theories of democracy, in directions entailing the formation of modern pluralistic societies wherein "secular ecclesia," called "voluntary associations"* and "professional organizations," have been decisive for modern pluralistic societies (see *Pluralism*). And John Bennett took Reinhold Niebuhr's "Christian realism"* into ecumenical ecclesial forums with special focus on political and economic ideology, while W. G. Muelder and his students have attempted to connect philosophical studies of natural law to theological ethics, and the results with historical and contemporary social analysis, to find a new synthesis of "Christian personalism"* and "democratic socialism*."

The work of these Troeltschians is paralleled by that of a number of other significant ethicists who struggle with the formation of communities of commitment on the basis of theological rootage and sociopolitical involvement, in order to find means of constructing what Troeltsch and Weber feared could not be easily constructed—a new ecclesially based Christian social philosophy faithful to biblical Christianity and directly pertinent to the guidance and reform of civilization*. Their efforts are paralleled by Catholic figures from John Courtney Murray and Jacques Maritain to find an ecclesially sound "public philosophy." The history of the "social encyclicals" from the 1890s to the pres-

ent gave wider impetus to other Catholic efforts (see *Official Roman Catholic Social Teaching*). Indeed, the main core of Christian social ethics as a discipline taught in Christian seminaries is rooted more in these quests than in any other single factor, and the most important professional society of working ethicists in North America, the Society of Christian Ethics, has had this concern at the center of its formation.

At the present time, at least one major debate rages in regard to ecclesiology and ethics in this tradition. If the center point of ecclesiology is "right order" or "polity," formed on the basis of theology and sociology, and if polity is inevitably influenced by both the demands of "pure" piety and the realistic cognizance of social dynamics, as it appears in "policy," which of the two influences should predominate in the formation of ecclesial polity—piety or policy? Is it the "being" of the church as a worshiping community that should shape polity? Is the priestly or "spiritual" impulse of the religious and ethical life of prime importance so that all patterns of organizational polity (and the policies entailed) established on earth by the people of God should follow from that which can sustain that core? Or is it the case that God has called the faithful together to accomplish godly purposes in the world? That is, should the ecclesia be conceived essentially as a people with a mission, a task, a direction of prophetic action, in short, a policy, so that the patterns of polity (and the forms of piety required to sustain motivation and solidarity for the task) should be so arranged to contribute to the fulfillment of these possibilities? The question can be put in other terms: is the normative order for church (and hence as a model for society) to be ontologically or functionally defined? Ought the church to be governed by deontological principles of righteousness derived from true piety or by teleological principles of purposes, ends, and objectives derived by the discernment of God's "policies"? Paul Ramsey has argued for the former (1967); Paul Lehmann for the latter (1963). Contemporary neo-evangelicals and liberationists have extended and further polarized the problems (see *Evangelical Ethics*; *Liberation Theology*).

And, of course, this question has wide-ranging implications for the understanding of the relationships of the Christian churches to

the more often we use the computer, the more we are likely to become dependent on it. This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the computer can help us to do things that we could not do before. On the other hand, it can also make us less capable of doing things without it.

At the same time, the computer is also making us more aware of the things that we are doing. We are becoming more conscious of our own actions and the consequences of those actions. This is a good thing, but it can also be a burden. We are being asked to do things that we may not want to do, and we are being asked to do them in a way that we may not want to. This is a challenge for us as individuals and as a society.

It is important that we take the time to think about these things. We need to ask ourselves what we want from technology and what we are willing to give up for it. We need to make sure that we are in control of the technology, not the other way around.

One of the most important things that we need to do is to make sure that we are using technology in a way that is ethical. We need to ask ourselves if what we are doing is right, if it is fair, and if it is honest. We need to make sure that we are not using technology to harm others or to deceive them. We need to make sure that we are using technology in a way that is consistent with our values and our principles.

Another important thing that we need to do is to make sure that we are using technology in a way that is sustainable. We need to ask ourselves if what we are doing is going to last, if it is going to be useful in the long run, and if it is going to be good for the environment. We need to make sure that we are using technology in a way that is responsible and that we are not wasting resources.

Technology is a powerful tool, and it has the potential to change the world. But it is also a double-edged sword. We need to be careful of how we use it, and we need to make sure that we are using it in a way that is ethical, sustainable, and responsible. We need to make sure that we are in control of the technology, not the other way around.

other religions and movements. Can Christians in Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, or tribal contexts utilize the authentic patterns of piety and ethics of those traditions to form entirely new polities for the ecclesia? And can Christians engaged in a social mission which they hold to be godly form solidarity structures with secular and even antireligious movements which are working for the same historical ends? In either case, is the result a true ecclesia? In posing the questions in these terms, we recognize some of the complexities of dealing with ecclesiology and ethics in our time. Every dimension of theological-ethical discourse and of sociocultural analysis must be identified, analyzed, and evaluated in a world where each level is vastly pluralized and complicated.

All of the above questions have been taken up in the 20th century by the second most important development in ecclesiology and ethics—the ecumenical movement*. After several centuries of fragmentation of the church by the rise of increased numbers of sects, denominations, nation-based "churches," and indigenous churches in decolonialized lands, the 20th century has seen a dramatic rise in the formation of ecumenical bodies. In nearly every land, federations or councils of churches exist. And everywhere one finds efforts to overcome previous divisions between religious groups—"united" and "uniting" churches, mergers, consultations on church union, and "family" reunions (World Alliance of Reformed Churches [Presbyterian and Congregational], Lutheran World Federation, etc.). Not only those communions rooted in the Reformation are joined in the councils of churches, but Roman Catholicism has both established new connections with previously separated bodies and, since Vatican Council II, engaged in an enormous range of interfaith and interreligious consultations. Further, denominations deriving from evangelical sects have formed national and international associations which raise comparable issues.

What is at stake for ecclesiology and ethics in these dramatic developments is that a trajectory of "conciliatory denominationalism"—the federated linkage of religious bodies meeting as equals—is understood to be the normative pattern for ecclesial polity and is set for the future. The ancient tradition of the church councils which established key theo-

logical doctrines is being retrieved and reestablished on a new ground of participatory, pluralistic, representative, democratically ordered catholicity. These councils attempt to clarify matters of piety as they bear on polity (e.g., the ecumenical "Lima agreements" on baptism, eucharist, and ministry), and on prophetic policies as they demand modification of polity (e.g., the Commission on Racism or the Commission on Women and Men in the Church). None of these developments is without difficulty, severe criticism, and resistance, but the suggestions of a new Christian social philosophy can be discerned in the agendas and documents of these new ecclesial efforts.

Not clear in many of these developments, however, are the two things that are ultimately required for a profound and durable new synthesis: compelling clarifications of the guiding theological-ethical principles, properly informed, as they must be to remain authentically Christian, by clear warrants from scripture, tradition, reason, and experience; and clarity in regard to the analysis of the modern world with all its intricate relationships, structures, institutions, tensions, confrontations, and competing philosophical modes of thought between and within the plethora of civilizations now having to live in a shrinking world. The task of addressing these issues, partly begun in ecumenical debates about human rights, faith and science, and peace priorities, remains a primary part of the agenda of religious social ethics for the future. In this effort, ethicists will have to be in constant dialogue with, on the one hand, those theologians who continue to focus on the core symbols and marks of the ecclesia, and, on the other, with social analysts and theorists of complex civilizations, constantly attempting to find those points of "compromise," in the sense of "co-promise," for normative ordering of life in, for, and with the whole people of God.

See Church and State.

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of the Church in the New Testament, 1960; R. J. Mouw, *Called to Holy Worldliness*, 1980; National Council of Churches, *The Ecclesiological Significance of Councils of Churches*, 1963; H. R. Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*, 1929; *The Kingdom of God in America*, 1937; and *Christ and Culture*, 1951; M. L. Stackhouse, *Creeks, Culture and Human Rights*, 1984; and *Ethics and the Urban Ethos*, 1973; E. Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1912), 2 vols., ET 1931; E. L. Underkoefler and A. Harsanyi, *The Unity We Seek*, 1977; M. Weber, *Economy and Society* (1922, 1925), ET 1968, vol. 2.

MAX L. STACKHOUSE

Ecology see **Energy**; **Environmental Ethics**; **Future Generations**, **Obligations to**; **Technology**

Economic Development

The theory and practice of the major Protestant churches with respect to economic development can be divided into three periods: the missionary period up to the early 1960s; the period between the World Council of Churches Assemblies at Uppsala and Nairobi (i.e., 1968–1975); and the period since the Nairobi Assembly. These three periods could conveniently be given the labels of naive pragmatism, developmentalism, and structuralism.

In the period of naive pragmatism, the churches sought to raise the standard of living of actual or potential members by providing education, health care, agricultural improvement schemes, and access to credit. At its worst, the church acted as no more than the agent of the state, but more frequently the relations between church and state were ambiguous and conflictual. Although church schools, for example, played a major role in providing the colonial power (see **Colonialism**) with appropriately trained workers, they also provided nascent nationalism* with its leadership. The churches played a significant role in introducing new cash crops—e.g., cotton to Uganda, cocoa to Ghana—but they were also early critics of labor conditions in the mines of central Africa, and of land apportionment in the settler colonies. These critical voices tended to be in a minority, however, and the dominant theme was a paternalistic concern to raise the living standards of the indigenous population in ways

and at a pace that were consistent with the interests of the colonial powers.

In the postcolonial period the churches, largely led by the Continental Roman Catholics, came to see economic development as an important part of the incarnation of the gospel. This enthusiasm came from a number of sources: postcolonial guilt, rising awareness of international income disparities, the supposed need to demonstrate the “relevance” of the gospel to an increasingly secular society, and the need to redefine a role for the metropolitan church in the former colonies.

The theological understanding of enthusiasm for economic development lagged far behind the elaboration of instruments designed to secure development. Common theological themes were Pauline body imagery, love, and thanksgiving. These were never successfully integrated into a coherent framework that transcended a biblicist sympathy with the lot of global neighbors.

By contrast, institutional development was rapid and widespread. The 1960s saw most churches developing overseas service agencies, on either a denominational or an ecumenical basis. Some, particularly in the USA, Germany, and Sweden, became significant channels for the disbursement of government development assistance, and/or food aid. While this permitted the rapid growth of these institutions, and their acquisition of a high level of professional expertise, it stored up largely unresolved problems for a later period.

By 1970 developmentalism was under severe attack in both secular and ecclesiastical circles. The failure of the UN Development Decade, declining political commitment in the industrialized countries, a strong suspicion (not amenable to empirical testing because of lack of data) that the numbers of persons in absolute poverty were increasing rather than diminishing, and a rediscovery of the centrality of justice, mercy, and righteousness in biblical ethics all combined to change the character of the development debate.

It is significant that the major intellectual impetus for this change came from the developing world itself—from the Philippines, from the small Christian communities of South Asia, and supremely from Latin America. The nodal expression of this new thinking came from the conference of the Roman Catholic bishops of Latin America at

and Iranian nationalism. For four decades, the Soviet mythology of Holy Mother Russia (more powerful and more enduring than Bolshevik ideology) has been in global conflict with an American Puritan ethos of a Chosen People.

Christian ethicists have frequently noted that these religious or quasi-religious aspects of nationalism-as-ideology intensify its moral ambiguity. Nationalism can evoke the most courageous, sacrificial behavior—or it can provoke the most brutal, self-aggrandizing acts.

In its early development, nationalism has typically inspired its apostles to a humanitarian struggle for justice* and freedom*. But the very success of a nationalist movement, particularly if it involves victory in a violent revolution* or warfare, is likely to be memorialized in a cult of militaristic virtues that, in turn, become the sanction for new acts of imperialism, oppression, and violence.

Nationalism assumes various forms and functions according to its political locus. There is a nationalism of colonial status: the cause of a people struggling for their political independence. There is a nationalism born of economic oppression*: an ideology* of liberation from structures of poverty and exploitation. The bitter Latin American experience in the Great Depression of the 1930s generated modern nationalism as a social force a century after most Latin states had achieved sovereign independence—a force that has more recently given expression to liberation theology*. There is a nationalism of political satellites: the passions of a people having the trappings of sovereignty but under the heavy political weight of a greater power. The vigor of Polish Catholic nationalism endures and is stimulated by the impositions of Soviet hegemony. There is a nationalism of ethnic separatism: the demand of a people for self-determination and sovereign identity based on a tribal, linguistic, or religious community with unsatisfied grievances against the larger political entity to which it is subjected. Biafra, Bangladesh, and Quebec are modern examples.

These "bottoms-up" forms of nationalism—nationalism as demands for social justice and liberation—contrast with the civil religions of established nation-states. The invocation of nationalist sentiment by rulers and leading citizens can be a force for unifying the people, preserving a cultural heritage, promoting artistic creativity, conserving the

natural environment, inspiring acts of courage and sacrifice. But nationalism is often invoked to solidify the status quo, suppress dissent, rationalize economic interests, obstruct international cooperation, launch aggressive conquests, or wage total war.

If the darker side of nationalism suggests to some ethicists that its abolition is an imperative for a peaceful world community, others continue to view nationalism as an irrepressible cultural force, if not the most powerful force, in the world today.

See International Order; Internationalism; National Sovereignty; State; World Government.

S. Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion*, 1947; J. C. Bennett, *Foreign Policy in Christian Perspective*, 1966; H. Butterfield, *International Conflict in the Twentieth Century: A Christian View*, 1960; E. Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role*, 1968.

ALAN GEYER

Natural Law

The origins of the notion of natural law can be traced back at least as far as the 5th century B.C. In the *Antigone* of Sophocles a contrast is drawn between the written laws of the state and the unwritten laws, which have a higher moral claim on us just because of our common humanity. This contrast is related to the dispute about the status of moral duties generally. Are moral obligations derived from human nature (*physis*) or convention (*nomos*)? The most fully articulated early theory of natural law is to be found in Stoic ethics*, and in the principle that the good life consists in *physikōs zēn*, living in accordance with nature, where "nature" includes not merely our human nature but the entire natural scheme of things in which human beings have their place.

Subsequent uses of the term "natural law" have been various. We shall here be concerned with theories of natural law within moral philosophy. It can in general be said of all such theories (and there are several distinct ones) that they start from a view of human nature arrived at by scientific and/or philosophical reflection; and they assert that this view of human nature will provide the basis for an account of moral values and obligations. The classical moral philosophers in the Western tradition have almost all

adopted some form of natural law theory. However, it must also be said that while they share the crucial tenet of a natural law theory, i.e., that moral duties can be ascertained by reflection on human nature, they differ widely in their views about what human nature is and, as a result, about the moral theory that can be derived from it. Thus, for example, Hobbes believed that human beings are motivated entirely by their desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, and that this entails that moral theory should be egoistic in character. Butler and Hume take a different view of human desires and hence reject a Hobbesian egoism. For Kant, human beings as moral agents are essentially rational, and the binding force of morality is not connected with human desires at all. On a Sartrean view, there is no human essence that could serve as the basis for morality; it is characteristic of authentic human nature to create its essence in the exercise of freedom. Again, for philosophers like Plato or Augustine, who adopt a dualist view of the mind-body relationship in human beings, the moral theory which results differs markedly from that derived by Aristotle or Aquinas, who do not adopt such a dualism, especially in regard to the moral value to be placed on the body and its drives, and on the emotions.

In the Christian tradition, the theory of natural law was developed in some detail by Aquinas, along fundamentally Aristotelian lines. It was Aquinas's view that by using our reason to reflect on our human nature, we could discover both the specific ends toward which we naturally tend (such as to live, to reproduce, to acquire knowledge, to have a role in an ordered society, to worship God) and the general end for which God created us, a blessed immortality. When we have discovered these ends, it is then possible for us to determine the means required to achieve them. This understanding of God's plan for us, built into our nature by his act of creation, Aquinas called natural law.

This general approach was taken much further by later Roman Catholic moralists, whose detailed applications of the method illustrate both the approach and its difficulties. They take as their starting point the Aristotelian notion of a natural teleology, the view that the human person as a whole has a function, and that the various human organs and capacities have their functions which subserve the good functioning of the

whole. An examination of the proper functioning of each human capability leads to the derivation of moral duties. Thus, one functions best, as a matter of natural necessity, if one has good health, is given an education, is allowed to make free choices, and so on. It is therefore immoral so to act as to damage anyone's health; it is likewise immoral to deprive people of an education, or of their freedom. So far, the approach would be reasonably uncontroversial. However, the same method was used to derive much more specific conclusions. The function of the human reproductive system is to produce children: it is therefore immoral to act in any way that will impede this natural function. Or again, the natural function of sexual organs is reproductive: therefore any use of them for other functions (such as to express homosexual love) is likewise immoral.

Evidently, such uses of the term "natural" are more controversial. It is one thing to say that the natural function of the eye is to see. But even bodily organs can and do serve several functions. And if one asks of the body as a whole what its function is, the answer is much less clear. Even less clear is the answer to questions such as "What is the function of a human life?" or "What is the function of sexuality in a human life?" The way one might try to answer these questions seems quite unlike the way one might try to answer questions about the function(s) of the endocrine glands or the heart in the human body. The notion of "function" at this point becomes much more a matter of moral assessment than of scientific inquiry. It might yet be possible to find some morally neutral way of examining such notions as human fulfillment in the scientific manner that is required by natural law theories in general. But no such approach has as yet been satisfactorily elaborated, and natural law theories can be regarded as adequate only to the extent that such elaboration is forthcoming.

The very possibility of a natural law theory of ethics has been attacked on other grounds as well. G. E. Moore argued that the very attempt to base ethics on any nonmoral account of what human beings are like is radically flawed by the naturalistic fallacy, since it argues from what human beings are like to what they morally ought to be like (see *Naturalistic Ethics*). This criticism is perhaps less conclusive than it was earlier thought to be, but it does point to the major difficulty con-

fronting any natural law theory, that its view of human nature is likely to be at least as controversial as the moral conclusions at which it arrives. Those who disagree with the conclusions are likely to question the picture of human beings on which those conclusions are based. Unless that picture can be firmly established in sufficient detail to warrant the moral inferences drawn from it, the theory as a whole will lack credibility. In particular, it will often be argued against natural law theories that the picture of human nature on which they rely will itself be the product of a moral outlook, rather than an independently established basis by which a moral outlook can be supported.

The entire approach has also been attacked on theological grounds. It has been argued that to assert that our human reason of itself, reflecting on our human nature, can arrive at a proper understanding of God's will for us is to undercut the need for grace, and also to ignore the fact that fallen humanity stands in need of the revelation given in Christ if human beings are to know what is good in God's eyes. The attempt to use our merely human estimate of right and wrong as a basis for Christian conduct is, on this view, regarded as a blasphemous willingness to exalt human reason, and fallen human reason at that, at the expense of God's revelation given to us in Christ. Controversy has arisen about the precise understanding of the term "nature" as it is used in Paul, especially in Rom. 1:18-21. Theologians of the different Christian traditions have understood this passage variously to refer to fallen nature, or to nature as originally created by God.

Whereas those theologians who hold a natural law theory of ethics will tend to play down or deny entirely the specificity of Christian ethics, those who reject a natural law approach will be much more ready to claim that Christian belief brings with it a radically new moral demand.

See *Christian Ethics; Law; Medieval Ethics; Thomistic Ethics; Modern Roman Catholic Moral Theology.*

J. M. Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, 1980.

GERARD J. HUGHES

Natural Rights

The belief that all human beings are equally entitled or justified, prior to all laws, cus-

toms, or agreements, in claiming against appropriate others certain kinds of performance or forbearance, which are sanctioned or enforceable upon default. This belief emerged as a relatively self-contained doctrine at the end of the 16th century in northern Europe and England, and was highly influential in that form through the 18th century. It is taken to be knowable by "natural" faculties, which means that it is available to all adult, sane human beings without special religious or other privileged inspiration. The ascriptions "inalienable" and "indefeasible" or "imprescriptable" are often attached to conceptions of natural rights. This belief in its classical form has been modified and revised in numerous ways in the 20th century (see *Human Rights*).

The sources of this belief are deeply embedded in the Greco-Roman and Western Christian outlooks, particularly in the conviction found in the Stoics, Paul, the Christian fathers, and much medieval Catholic thought, that all human beings are born with an equal potential for individual self-direction with respect to fundamental matters of conscience, namely, basic questions of faith and morals. The idea that individual conscience* is in some important sense naturally sovereign over, and thus prior to, all earthly authorities has underlain numerous Christian reform movements, and most prominently the Protestant Reformation. References to a "natural right" to hold religious belief and to consent or not to political authorities are sprinkled throughout the writings of 16th-century Calvinist revolutionaries like Christopher Goodman and Robert Browne, and 17th-century English Puritan radicals like the Levellers, ideas that were in part inspired by Calvin's own utterances.

However, the systematic and self-conscious formulation of this doctrine occurred first in the thought of Hugo Grotius, the Dutch Protestant theologian and international lawyer (b. 1583). The crucial step was to state unequivocally, as Grotius did, that certain moral requirements might "naturally" be known without benefit of belief in God (though Grotius was a believer himself). Grotius held that human beings were born free and equal agents with a deep aspiration for peaceful, cooperative existence, and that the only way to achieve that end was to create laws and institutions that honored and protected the natural condition of equal free-

imation of dictatorship and mass politics peculiar to the 20th century.

See Dictatorship; State; Tyrannicide.

H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, rev. ed., 1967; C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 1965; C. J. Friedrich, M. Curtis, and B. R. Barber, *Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views*, 1969.

J. R. C. WRIGHT

Totalitarianism see Fascism; Totalitarian State

Totality, Principle of

The most general form of the principle of totality states that the good of the part may legitimately be sacrificed for the good of the whole. The principle finds its most natural application in the case of organisms, such as human beings, but it has also been applied by analogy to nonorganic wholes such as the family, the state, or society at large. The principle has been invoked especially in medical ethics, as part of an argument to justify, e.g., sterilization as a method of contraception where childbearing might prove injurious to health. A healthy reproductive system is sacrificed for the sake of the human being as a whole. This principle might also serve to establish the conclusion that it is right for soldiers to give their lives to ensure the safety of their country.

The principle of totality has proved highly controversial. In some applications it might seem quite unobjectionable, whereas in others it has been regarded as tantamount to the equally controversial view that the ends justify the means (see also *Ends and Means*). In general, it seems that the principle is too vague to support the weight of argument that has been laid upon it.

GERARD J. HUGHES

Trade Unions and Professional Associations

In Western-type economies, trade unions and professional associations are organs through which those who earn their living in a job or a profession join together to exercise some control over the terms and conditions under which they work as against the power of the employer or management, whether public or private. In centralized collective economies

they are bodies through which certain government policies in work, social, and health matters are propagated, but they do not form an independent power base. Professional associations have other functions, such as guaranteeing standards of work and protecting the consumer against possible idiosyncracies of a practitioner (see *Professional Ethics*). Trade unions share these functions to a lesser extent in social and educational roles and sometimes in apprenticeship regulations. Some unions are for a specific occupation; some are general or industrial unions. Interunion disunity and rivalries can sometimes cause trouble and be as difficult to mend as disunity among the Christian churches. How far unions should participate in management problems is much debated in general and within unions, and opinions and practices are divided, some seeing it as a desirable extension of democratic procedures to industry, others as a confusion of roles. In Western-type economies West Germany has gone farthest in this direction; in collectivist economies Hungary and Yugoslavia.

An ethical issue often raised is that of the closed shop. The *pre*-entry form of it precludes the employment of anyone not already in a union, the *post*-entry form requires all workers once employed to join. The former is open to the objection of being too restrictive, the latter is often favored by managements as simplifying industrial relations*. Trouble arises when there is a conscientious objector, sometimes a Christian, with a very individualist outlook. In proportion to the strength of the union it may be urged on it to agree that union dues might in this case be given to a nominated charity instead. Unions of course need to see that their internal procedures conform to principles of natural justice.

See Collective Bargaining; Labor Movements; Strikes.

RONALD PRESTON

Tradition in Ethics

The term "tradition" can refer either to something handed down from generation to generation (*tradtum*) or to the mode of transmission itself (*traditio*). No one doubts that there are ethical traditions in both senses, but there is no consensus among students of morality concerning the nature and significance of tradition in ethics. Several major movements in modern ethical thought

portray tradition as inessential to ethics or even as morally dangerous, though each has met with serious opposition.

Some Protestants have argued that scripture, interpreted by human reason in light of the Holy Spirit, should serve as the sole rule of faith and morals. Their point has been to deny tradition the essential role ascribed to it in Catholicism, where the living magisterium* functions not only as the definitive interpreter of scriptural revelation but also as the official organ of nonscriptural divine traditions. Against the doctrine of *sola scriptura*, Catholics have maintained that scripture cannot operate independently as a rule of faith and morals, for scripture is silent on some important matters, requires interpretation disciplined by tradition, and does not provide a criterion for determining which writings are genuinely scriptural. Without denying the authority of scripture, Catholics have therefore insisted upon the necessity of acknowledging tradition as a source of authority as well. On the other hand, Protestants have often seen tradition as too inconsistent and corruptible to be a genuine source of moral authority. Not all Protestants, however, have taken such a dim view of tradition, and Protestant theologians like James Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas are among those now assigning tradition a central role in ethics.

Many modern moral philosophers have viewed tradition as, at best, an ultimately dispensable aid to fallible human reason and, at worst, a repository of superstition and a threat to autonomy*. They have therefore attempted to ground moral knowledge and action in something not essentially dependent upon tradition. For intuitionists, moral knowledge is derived from a foundation of certitudes accessible in principle to all rational persons. For followers of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), morality is a set of rules required by pure reason, rules we legislate for ourselves out of respect for free rational agency (see *Kantian Ethics*). Even the received moral teachings of Christ, according to Kant, must be subjected to scrutiny by autonomous reason before being accepted as authoritative.

Intuitionists and Kantians face a common difficulty—that of how to square moral variety or disagreement with the idea that moral knowledge derives from foundational certitudes or from the requirements of pure rea-

son. Why, if moral knowledge is what intuitionists and Kantians have said it is, do some ethical traditions differ significantly from others? One answer, Kant's own, is that some traditions are simply more fully rational than others. They are further along the road to moral perfection. Kant, who took a more favorable view of tradition than many of his followers have, interpreted religious traditions as "vehicles" of perfect moral rationality, vehicles that help fallible human beings make progress toward pure rational faith. Religious traditions, while dispensable in the long run, are suited to the failings of sensuous humanity, but some represent relatively little progress toward perfection, others more. Kant thus explains moral variety by judging some traditions less rational than others and then endeavoring to show how nonrational factors enter in. His successors, however, have been reluctant to declare alien traditions irrational without closer examination. Some have tried to show that much of the putative evidence of moral diversity is merely apparent. Others, agreeing that Kant's ascriptions of irrationality cannot be supported but remaining unpersuaded that moral diversity can simply be explained away, have suggested that practical reason makes use of tradition-bound presuppositions and that variation in such presuppositions explains variation in moral conclusions.

This last option in effect grants what the proponents of tradition have insisted upon all along—that tradition is essential to moral reasoning, that the rational acceptability of a moral conclusion can be determined only relative to a context of inherited assumptions, and that "pure reason" does not suffice to generate a uniquely rational moral system. Once this much has been granted, however, it becomes hard to avoid the further conclusion that pure reason is an empty abstraction lacking any explanatory power whatsoever. This was the conclusion G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) drew in his critique of Kant, and recent defenses of tradition as an essential dimension of the moral life continue to show Hegel's influence. Those most deeply influenced by Hegel—philosophers like Hans-Georg Gadamer and Alasdair MacIntyre, theologians like David Tracy—have taken pains to dissociate themselves from a picture of tradition as basically continuous and conservative. For such thinkers, traditions are ongoing conversations or arguments

subject to dramatic reversal and, at times, revolutionary innovation. Tradition, for them, far from being opposed to critical reason, is its necessary embodiment (see Hegelian Ethics).

See also Authority; Bible in Christian Ethics.

J. M. Gustafson, *Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective*, vol. 1: *Theology and Ethics*, 1981, ch. 3; A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 1981, ch. 15.

JEFFREY STOUT

Tranquilizers see Drug Addiction

Transcendence

To transcend is to go beyond or surpass something. Human beings are peculiarly able to transcend what they receive from nature, environment, and society. This self-transcendence or creative freedom is recognized as being of central ethical significance in existentialism. Furthermore, it informs Marx's conviction of humanity's ability, collectively, to transcend socioeconomic alienation. The way of transcendence, in which the natural self is transcended in other-directed action and concern, has also been commended as the essence of a secular Christianity. But a theological anthropology sees in human "openness to the future" (Pannenberg) or in "transcendental experience" (Rahner) an indication of what makes such human transcendence possible, namely, an "all-encompassing reality," an ultimate supernatural transcendence, that calls us out of nature and makes possible human transcendence. This divine transcendence, which for Christian theology differentiates the Creator from the creature, for Christian ethics constitutes the absolute ground of all goodness, beauty, and truth. Just because it is the ground and resource of all human transcendence, this divine transcendence cannot be thought of apart from divine immanence, whereby the Spirit of God is present and active in and through the creature.

Modern Christianity has felt the force of the criticism that traditional conceptions of divine transcendence inhibit and threaten human freedom, and has sought to develop a nonalienating conception of divine transcendence that can be seen as liberating rather than oppressive (Macquarrie). An increasingly influential way of doing this has been in

Transsexualism

terms of "the future as a new paradigm of transcendence" (Moltmann). But this emphasis is in danger of obscuring the equally liberating immanence of divine incarnation and presence.

J. Macquarrie, *In Search of Humanity*, 1982; J. Moltmann, *The Future of Creation*, ET 1979.

BRIAN HEBBLETHWAITE

Transcendentalism

see New England Transcendentalism

Transplants, Transplantation

see Organ Transplantation

Transsexualism

The transsexual is a normal male or female according to physiological criteria, but experiences himself or herself as a member of the opposite sex, and may seek hormonal and surgical reassignment—a so-called "sex-change." The specific medical and social recognition of transsexualism is very recent—essentially since 1952 when former American GI Christine Jorgensen made world headlines by undergoing sex-change surgery. However, the historical and cross-cultural evidence suggests that transsexualism has been known from early antiquity and within a variety of cultures.

Transsexualism is to be distinguished from several other conditions: physiological intersexuality (hermaphroditism), where the person has some actual physiological characteristics of the opposite sex; transvestism, where a male experiences erotic arousal from dressing in female clothing, but is generally heterosexual in practice and does not seek surgical reassignment; and homosexuality, where there may be little or no sense of cross-gender identity.

A number of legal and ethical questions are raised by transsexualism. It may be possible to change most personal documents after reassignment, but often not the birth certificate.

Another question is the status of marriage and sexual relationships for the postoperative transsexual. The transsexual may regard the relationship as heterosexual, but he or she was formerly classified as a member of the same sex as his or her partner, and is still genetically a member of that sex.

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Even conscience* itself is sometimes viewed more as a sanction than an authority when its threat of disunity and disharmony motivates the agent to perform actions that he or she otherwise would have had difficulty undertaking (see also Mixed Motives). Some philosophers distinguish morality and law* in part according to the nature of their sanctions: Morality often involves sanctions of praise and blame, while law often involves sanctions of force. The term "sanction" frequently refers to coercive measures such as criminal punishment or embargoes. Hence the major ethical questions focus on when it is justifiable to use coercion* and what sort of coercion is justifiable. Views about the necessity and importance of sanctions as motivating reasons for actions often depend on doctrines of human nature, particularly its disposition to sin* (see Original Sin; Realism).

See also Behavior Control; Coercion; International Order; Law; Morality, Legal Enforcement of; Penology; Power; Resistance; State.

JAMES F. CHILDRESS

Sanctity of Life see Life, Prolongation of; Life, Sacredness of

Sanctuary see Refugees

Satyagraha

Gandhi's designation for his movement of nonviolent resistance against the British in India. It means firm and steadfast adherence to the truth. See Civil Disobedience; Resistance.

Scandal

Scandal arises when a member of the Christian community, by action or opinions, goes against the commonly accepted standards of the community and causes distress to the other members, perhaps even bringing the whole community into disrepute. From the earliest times, the church has had to exercise discipline* in order to deal with erring members and to maintain its standards. The really difficult case, however, is the one in which the person who gives rise to the scandal is acting not from carelessness or rebellion against the church, but from conscience*, sincerely believing that he or she has a right or a duty to declare the opinion or perform the actions that are scandalizing the others. In such cases

we should remember the advice given by Paul in 1 Cor. 10. Things that are lawful may not be expedient, and even where individuals are passionately convinced of the rightness of their acts or opinions, they ought to act with charity* toward their brethren. It may become a very difficult matter to decide between the prompting of the individual conscience and the distress caused to the community. Conscience cannot be coerced, but before causing scandal by some unilateral act, a member of the community should consider very carefully whether he or she is acting with charity to the others, and whether really impelled by conscience or by less worthy motives, such as pride and the desire for notoriety.

JOHN MACQUARRIE

Science and Ethics

The word "science" covers a wide range of meanings: (1) a system of knowledge, split up into a number of distinct "sciences," which together constitute a more or less coherent scientific world view; (2) a method of investigation characterized by a rational empirical, objective, and critical approach to natural phenomena; (3) applied science (technology*)—the ability to manipulate the natural world predictably. "Science" in all these senses is of concern to ethics, though in different ways that need to be carefully distinguished.

1. *Science as a source of factual information.* Moral judgments are not made *in vacuo*, but require a knowledge of facts and an ability to predict the probable consequences of actions. Scientists are concerned with both. The general scientific understanding of the world is therefore an important part of the background of moral choice, and many traditional moral issues have been seen in a different light as scientific knowledge has increased. Sexual morality, for example, has been affected by advances in physiology and psychology, even among those who would claim that there has been no change in the fundamental principles that should govern sexual behavior. Homosexuality remains for many an area of moral uncertainty, partly for the reason that there is not as yet any scientific agreement about its causes. A soundly based concern about the moral dimensions of animal welfare needs to pay proper attention to biology. Sociologists offer interpretations of human behavior that, by revealing the

character and extent of social constraints, can enlarge the area of choice. To know that one is conforming to type is to be given the freedom not to do so. Psychology can create similar areas of freedom, as well as enlarge perceptions of the consequences of behavior on other people.

In addition to these countless general ways in which scientific knowledge has ethical implications, there are also examples of particular discoveries that relate to particular moral choices. The link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer has created new moral problems for smokers and tobacco manufacturers. Work on the deleterious effects of bottle-feeding infants in Third World countries has opened up a new moral dimension in the promotion and export of dried milk. Once again, the list is endless (see Risk).

There are also less direct ways in which scientific information has influenced ethical thinking. Anthropology* has weakened the appeal of authoritarian ethical systems by its disclosure of the enormous variety of social patterns and of the extent to which morality is socially conditioned. The moral sense itself has become an object of scientific study. Research on the social behavior of animals, developmental psychology, and the evolutionary origins of altruism have led some scientists to conclude that there are certain moral norms or tendencies, discoverable by science, built into human nature. The new, and controversial, science of sociobiology attempts to explore this field from an evolutionary perspective.

2. *Science as a source of values.* Since G. E. Moore's description of the naturalistic fallacy (see Naturalistic Ethics), it has been customary to hold that statements of value cannot be derived exclusively from statements of fact; in other words, science by itself cannot prescribe what is right or wrong. In most practical contexts this is obviously true. Sound factual information is a necessary but not a sufficient basis for moral choice. Judgment about the facts goes beyond the facts themselves.

This neat distinction, however, ignores the extent to which facts and values are interrelated. It can be questioned whether any facts are totally value-free. Thus it is possible for moral judgments to appear to be made on strictly factual grounds by overlooking the element of evaluation already built into them.

The various systems of evolutionary eth-

ics*, of which T. H. Huxley, Julian Huxley, and, from a Christian perspective, Walter Rauschenbusch were notable exponents, made use of the idea of evolutionary "progress"* as a moral guide, as if it could somehow be read directly from the biological facts themselves. Sociobiology provides the most modern attempt to perform the same operation, but has difficulty in producing convincing evidence of evolutionary traits in human nature strong enough to be treated as ethically normative. Psychology has been a fruitful source of hidden norms, as expressed in such concepts as abnormality or maturity, both of which are extremely hard to detach from their cultural contexts.

The most powerful claim that science provides a source of values is made, not on the basis of any particular discoveries or theories, but by extrapolation from the scientific method itself. Science "works," runs this claim, and intrinsic to it are certain values and attitudes that are validated by this success. Jacques Monod (*Chance and Necessity*, ET 1972) proposed what he called "an ethic of knowledge" in which the main value is objective knowledge itself.

Monod's proposal was criticized for its arbitrariness and restrictiveness. There is, however, a more general and acceptable sense in which the values inherent in scientific activity spill over into ordinary life. Scientists form a community with its own professional code concerned with such matters as honesty in reporting facts, the publication of unfavorable as well as favorable evidence, the acknowledgment of sources and the safeguarding of original discoveries, and cooperation with colleagues irrespective of nationality. In addition the successful scientist depends on personal moral qualities such as open-mindedness, a readiness to accept criticism, patience, persistence, love of the truth for its own sake, even an element of passion. Some have described science as an adventure of faith. Scientific progress would not be possible unless by and large scientists could trust one another, and this is why in professional terms the penalties for fraud are high.

In its beginnings modern science depended on the moral and philosophical assumptions of Christian Europe. Nowadays, in the light of its practical achievements, the values that sustain it have come to be regarded by many as self-authenticating. Science is its own justification, and what makes for good science

must itself be good. Misplaced trust is eventually exposed, and the overwhelming weight of scientific opinion acts to reinforce the values of the scientific community. In this very general sense, therefore, it can be argued that science operates as a moral force. Critics of this argument point out that in practice the main characteristic of science is power rather than disinterested knowledge. And scientific power can suffer the same corruptions as any other kind of power.

3. *Science as a source of new ethical problems.* Applied science has given humanity increasing power to control and adapt its environment, and to manipulate some of the most fundamental characteristics of human life and society. New powers always create ethical problems of peculiar difficulty, since there are no precedents to act as guides. Nevertheless certain general principles seem to apply. Broadly speaking, answers to questions about the use of new powers reflect differing views about the place of human beings in nature. At one extreme are those who stress the "givenness" of the natural world and the dangers of upsetting the existing order of things (see *Natural Law*). At the other extreme are those who doubt whether "givenness" means much in an evolving universe, and who see every new advance as increasing the range of human choice, and hence the possibilities of human freedom and personal fulfillment. Both extremes are found among Christians, some emphasizing human creatureliness and others human creativeness. The weight of Christian opinion, however, has generally been on the side of conservatism*, and there is a long history of opposition to new techniques, not least in medicine (see *Bioethics*).

Technical power tends to be morally ambiguous. The new freedoms it brings often have hidden costs. The automobile is a classic example of a technological advance that has enormously increased the range of human experience, but has also created new forms of enslavement as well as huge environmental damage. Nuclear energy contains both a promise and a threat. New understandings of human psychology open the way to new forms of human manipulation. Perhaps the biggest source of moral ambiguity today is the extent to which almost any discovery can be made to serve military purposes (see also *Energy; Environmental Ethics; Nuclear Warfare*).

Advances in the biological sciences closely affecting human life itself already pose some intractable problems that are likely to become even more difficult as research continues. The ethics of research on human embryos, for example, must depend in part on the length of time for which it is possible to keep an isolated embryo alive; and all the evidence suggests that this is likely to increase. The possibilities of genetic manipulation pose in an especially acute form questions about the extent to which the "givenness" of human nature should be regarded as inviolable. Even such a relatively simple operation as choosing the sex of one's children has deep personal and social implications (see also *Experimentation with Human Subjects; Genetics; Reproductive Technologies*).

The abuse of psychiatry for penal purposes in the USSR is a particularly striking example of the way therapeutic insights can be used to serve evil ends. Fears that some genetic studies might act as a basis for racial discrimination have led to acrimonious controversy both in Britain and in the USA. And at the more trivial end of the scale, there are those who regard public opinion polls, a very modest instance of scientific data collection, as a threat to electoral integrity.

"Big science," of a size that has to be funded directly by government or some major industry, presents special problems of control and assessment, not least when most of the available expertise is engaged in, and therefore has a vested interest in, the particular project in question. The preliminary work on atomic energy suffered this kind of isolation, with the result that its moral and political implications came to the surface too late to influence the course of research.

It is an open question whether research may or may not be inherently immoral. Clearly there are, or ought to be, moral limits to the methods used in research, especially insofar as these apply to human beings or animals*. But are there some things that it is better not to know? Most scientists would deny this, even though Pandora's box once opened proves impossible to close.

R. Attfield, *The Ethics of Environmental Concern*, 1983; J. Habgood, *A Working Faith*, 1980; J. Mahoney, *Bioethics and Belief*, 1984; J. R. Ravetz, *Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems*, 1971; R. Trigg, *The*

Shaping of Man, 1982; World Council of Churches, *Faith and Science in an Unjust World*, 1979.

JOHN HABGOOD

Scrupulosity

A term used in Catholic moral theology to denote the overuse of the confessional for the confession* of trivial and diminutive sins. Though absolution* is eagerly sought, it is never fully satisfying to scrupulous persons in this sense of "overscrupulous," who fear they may have forgotten something, and who will soon return to confess many of the same offenses.

From the standpoint of psychology, scrupulosity is closely related to an obsessive-compulsive neurotic pattern of behavior. Persons afflicted with this disorder are obsessed with certain ideas which they can only put out of their minds by repeating certain actions, such as a hand-washing compulsion, which is associated with the need to assuage guilt feelings. In such cases the thing for which guilt is consciously felt (dirty hands) is a disguised representation of unconscious guilt too painful to bear in conscious awareness. This is the reason that the confessions of scrupulous persons deal with such trivial matters. The trivia cloak unconscious guilt feelings which usually relate to childhood experiences with parents and the fantasies about these, such as the wish to kill the father, though they often have associations with adult life as well.

Though Protestants who do not have formal confession do not use the term, the phenomenon is present in overzealous church workers who seemingly cannot find enough to do in the church, and also frequently seek the pastor out to pour out their troubles and get advice, which is seldom taken. In such cases psychiatric help may be indicated, though such help may be unwanted, since the symptoms are partly intended to keep such persons unaware of their disturbing unconscious guilt feelings as well as providing a degree of release from them.

See also Guilt; Defense Mechanisms.

JAMES N. LAPSLEY

Secrecy

Secrecy may be defined as "intentional concealment" (Bok). There are several conceptual and moral questions about its links to

autonomy*, privacy*, and confidentiality*, as well as to deception and truthfulness*. The question of the ethical justification of intentional concealment, or intentional nondisclosure of information, is not reducible to the ethics of lying, even though they may overlap where there are affirmative duties to disclose information. As Bok notes, secrets do not stand in need of justification in the same way as lies, because secrets are morally neutral rather than *prima facie* wrong. And secrets are frequently legally protected, e.g., in confidential relations between physicians and patients and between priests and penitents (see Codes of Ethics; Confidentiality; Professional Ethics). However, in several areas of life, such as government, business (e.g., trade secrets), and science, there is significant debate about which secrets, if any, are justified, particularly in view of the interests of others in the concealed information. In a democracy*, the public is presumed to have a right to relevant information, but secrets are often alleged to be justified, at least temporarily, by political or military necessity* in foreign policy and military actions. Such secrets are sometimes disclosed to the public through whistle-blowing*. In the USA the Freedom of Information Act (1966, strengthened in 1974) granted citizens broader access to government information, within certain limits, including national security and crime prevention.

S. Bok, *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*, 1983; I. Galnoor (ed.), *Government Secrecy in Democracies*, 1977; K. G. Robertson, *Public Secrets: A Study of the Development of Government Secrecy*, 1982; R. B. Stevenson, Jr., *Corporations and Information—Secrecy, Access, and Disclosure*, 1980.

JAMES F. CHILDRESS

Sect

In theology and much ordinary usage, "sect" refers to a body of believers who follow a particular practice, doctrine, or leader distinct from that of the majority or "orthodox" norm, but within the same religion. Until recently, established churches in Europe referred to all nonestablished churches as sects and lumped "free churches," cults, and denominations in this category.

A sect may be schismatic, heterodox, or

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in which one's future fate may be changed—through meditation, austerity, moral effort, faith in God, etc. Analogous to this is the way in which the Greek gods, and even humans, might interfere with otherwise ordained destinies. Thus Zeus (*Iliad*, book 16) contemplates saving Sarpedon from his doom, long since fixed by fate. Similarly the determinism implicit in Qur'anic teaching is held in conjunction with the doctrine of the capacity of the individual to perform the duties laid upon him or her by faith.

On the other hand, in Islam and elsewhere, there have been attempts to interpret destiny as unconditional and universal. Thus the Jivikas (a movement contemporary with the Buddha) held a doctrine of fate (*niyati*) as wholly determining the future. Hence the good works (such as austerity) associated with a liberated life are symptoms, not causes, of salvation. A similar conclusion, not based, however, on the concept of fate, but rather on that of the will of God, is found in Muslim and Christian predestinationism.

Fatalism as an attitude involves resignation to one's future lot, together with a sense of its unalterability. The first of these elements can appear, in theistic religions, as faith in providence. The second is a deduction sometimes made from determinism, whether the latter is conceived in terms of God's governance of events or in terms of empirical causation.

The standard reply to fatalism is that it depends on an invalid inference. Thus "Either I shall be alive in 2000 or I shall not; and suppose that I shall be alive: then I shall be no matter what I do. Consequently, I can smoke fifty cigarettes a day." This is invalid reasoning, because my actions enter into the causation of future events. Even if my actions are determined, this gives no ground for doing A rather than B, unless I know which way I am determined to act. But even here the very knowledge of the future gives me an opportunity to avoid disasters, etc.

See Free Will and Determinism.

A. J. Ayer, *The Concept of a Person*, 1964; S. G. F. Brandon, *Man and His Destiny in the Great Religions*, 1962; *History, Time and Deity*, 1965; D. Davidson, "Mental Events," in *Philosophy as It Is*, ed. T. Honderich and M. Burnyeat, 1979.

NINIAN SMART

Feminist Ethics

In its most general sense "feminist ethics" refers to any ethical theory that locates its roots in feminism, and especially in the contemporary feminist movement. Feminism, in its most fundamental meaning, is a conviction and a movement opposed to discrimination* on the basis of gender. It opposes, therefore, any ideology, belief, attitude, or behavior that establishes or reinforces such discrimination. In terms of social structure, feminism is opposed primarily to patriarchy. The ultimate aim of feminism is equality* among persons regardless of gender. Since discrimination on the basis of gender (sexism) is perceived by feminists as pervasively discrimination against women, feminism aims to correct this bias by a bias for women. This includes a focal concern for the well-being of women and a taking account of women's experience as a way to understand what well-being means for women and men.

Feminist theory appears in a variety of disciplines, including philosophy, the social and behavioral sciences, and theology. It is also expressed in principles of interpretation for literary and historical texts and for religious scriptures. Major tasks undertaken by feminist scholars include the critique of sources of sexism (for example, religious, social, political, economic); retrieval of women's history and pro-woman myths; reconstruction of theories of the human person and the human community. Feminist ethics, insofar as it is done systematically, draws on all of this work.

There is pluralism within feminism, and hence within feminist ethics. Differences are sometimes identified according to analyses of the causes of sexism and strategies to correct it. Thus, for example, a liberal feminist ethic advocates the extension of the liberal tradition of political rights to women and a corresponding reform of discriminatory policies of gender role differentiation. A socialist feminist ethic is primarily concerned with changing the forms of production in society in order to secure economic parity and autonomy for women. A radical feminist ethic believes that the only way to alleviate women's oppression is to achieve total autonomy for women (political, economic, sexual, and reproductive), and to do this through separatism or by seizing power from men. Much of feminist ethics incorporates varying combinations of these views.

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In the first part of the paper, the author discusses the general theory of the subject. He begins by pointing out that the theory is based on the assumption that the system is in a state of equilibrium. This is a reasonable assumption for many practical purposes, but it is not always true. The author then goes on to discuss the various factors that can disturb the equilibrium, such as changes in the external conditions or internal parameters of the system. He also discusses the methods for analyzing the system's behavior in these cases, and shows how the theory can be used to predict the system's response to different disturbances. The author then discusses the various factors that can disturb the equilibrium, such as changes in the external conditions or internal parameters of the system. He also discusses the methods for analyzing the system's behavior in these cases, and shows how the theory can be used to predict the system's response to different disturbances.

It is now necessary to consider the question of the stability of the equilibrium. This is a question that has been discussed by many authors, and there is a large literature on the subject. The author discusses the various methods for analyzing the stability of the equilibrium, and shows how the theory can be used to predict the system's behavior in these cases. He also discusses the various factors that can disturb the equilibrium, such as changes in the external conditions or internal parameters of the system. He also discusses the methods for analyzing the system's behavior in these cases, and shows how the theory can be used to predict the system's response to different disturbances.

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Despite the pluralism in feminism and feminist ethics, there are generally shared issues and basic principles. Major questions in feminist theology and philosophy that have produced common ethical issues include: the meaning of human embodiment* (especially issues of human sexuality); the nature of the human self (including possibilities for the development of character); the value of the world of nature; patterns for human relationships (both personal and political). Significant methodological and substantive principles can be formulated that express strong currents of feminist ethical reflection on these issues.

There is a firm methodological commitment to maintaining a focus on the experience of women as the primary source for feminist ethics. Like feminism in general, feminist ethics traces its origins to women's growing awareness of the disparity between received traditional interpretations of their identity and function and their own experience of themselves and their lives. It also claims an important hermeneutical vantage point in a focus on women's experience precisely as disadvantaged. Methodologically, feminist ethics has been open to both deontological and teleological patterns of reasoning. On the one hand, it has taken seriously the possibility that human actions can be judged unethical insofar as they contradict values intrinsic to the concrete reality of persons. On the other hand, feminist ethics sustains a concern for consequences, for an ethical evaluation of means in relation to ends and of parts in relation to the whole; overall it is favorable to an ecological view of reality, and it allows the relativization of values in situations of conflict (as, for example, when dealing with issues of abortion*).

Feminist ethics as a systematic discipline is new enough that it is difficult to generalize its substantive principles. One way of identifying them could go something like this. The most fundamental substantive principle is the principle that women are fully human and are to be valued as such. The content of this principle differs significantly from similar but nonfeminist affirmations. It is not, for example, to be mistaken for the view that women are human, though derivatively and partially so. Rather, feminist belief about the humanness of women is specified by the inclusion of further principles of equality and auton-

omy*, and it is qualified by a principle of mutuality. Even radical feminism accepts these principles in some form, though both separatism and matriarchy present serious difficulties for a principle of equality, unless they are understood as necessary means to egalitarian contexts.

The insistence on the combination of principles of autonomy, equality, and mutuality differentiates feminist ethics from some other ethical theories. Feminist ethics wants to specify the formal principle of "equal treatment for equals," noting the necessity of discerning who are equals in terms of basic humanity. Moreover, feminist ethics rejects strong theories of complementarity that, in the name of "different but equal" identifications, disguise patterns of inequality (relationships in which the role of one partner is always inferior to, dependent on, or instrumental to the role of another). Feminist ethics insists, therefore, that the essential feature of personhood, which modern liberal philosophy identified for human persons as such (that is, the feature of individual autonomy, grounded in the capacity for free self-determination), be appropriated for women as well as for men. On this basis, the feminist principle of equality, of the equal right of all persons to respect as persons, is maintained (*see also* Respect for Persons).

Feminist ethics, however, extends the principle of equality to a principle of equitable sharing. That is, out of women's experience of disadvantage and their perception of the disadvantaged histories of other groups, feminists argue for a universalized right of all to an equitable share in the goods and services necessary to human life and basic happiness. Feminist ethics generally includes, therefore, a positive form of the principle of equality, one based not only on the self-protective right of each to freedom, but on the participation of all in human solidarity.

Closely aligned with this, feminist ethics could be described as rejecting a view of human persons that is self-isolating. Hence, it tends to combine some form of the principle of mutuality with the principle of equality. Its basis for doing this is a view of personhood that identifies relationality along with autonomy as an essential feature of human persons. Feminist ethics insists, then, on the need for a corrective to a liberal philosophy that fails to understand persons as embedded

subjects, with an essential capacity and need for union with other persons. But feminist ethics generally sees itself also as a corrective to romantic theories of sociality, organic models of society, or theories of complementarity in which relation is all, without regard for free agency or for personal identity, power, and worth, which transcend roles.

Generating principles of equality and mutuality, feminist ethics includes a critique not only of sexism but also of racism and classism. Moreover, in opposing a general pattern of dominance and subjugation, it gives ethical priority to models of human relationships characterized by collaboration rather than competition or hierarchical gradation. In some of its forms it is also an advocate of nonviolence.

Methodological and substantive principles for feminist ethics have been identified. It must be added that some feminist ethicists prefer to avoid the language of "principles" altogether. This follows a recognition of past abuses where principles were used to oppose, rather than serve, the well-being of persons and relations, and where principles were maintained without any acknowledgment of the historical and social nature of human knowledge.

Some feminist ethical reflection can be more specifically described as Christian feminist ethics. This can include much of what has already been noted, but also a more direct concern with issues shaped by Christian belief and theology. Thus, for example, Christian feminist ethics takes a critical stance in relation to past theological justifications of the inferiority of women to men. It opposes the distinction of male and female as polar opposites (representing mind/body, reason/emotion, activity/passivity, dependency/autonomy). It challenges the association of women with religious symbols of evil, but it is also opposed to religious "pedestalism," or the expectation that women will be more virtuous than men. A Christian feminist ethics takes seriously the radical feminist critique of Christianity as a religion that can lead to the exaltation of dependence and suffering. As Christian and feminist, then, it takes as one of its tasks the formulation of a theory of moral and religious development and a feminist theory of virtue or character. Christian feminists have also identified problems with traditional concepts of *agapē*, and they seek

to balance principles of equality and mutuality with the notion of self-sacrifice. Finally, Christian feminists are concerned with the formulation of a theory of justice*, one that will illuminate more adequately every form of human and Christian relationship.

See Love; Sex Discrimination; Women, Status of.

M. Daly, *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*, 1978; E. Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Reconstruction of Christian Origins*, 1983; B. Harrison, *Our Right to Choose: Toward A New Ethic of Abortion*, 1983; R. Ruether, *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology*, 1983; L. Russell, *The Future of Partnership*, 1979.

MARGARET A. FARLEY

Fetal Research

Ethical issues in fetal research are associated with but are not reducible to those involved in abortion*. The ethical standards involved are similar to those involved in experimentation with human subjects*, but their application to fetal research is controversial because of debates about the moral status of the human fetus, defined as the human embryo from conception to delivery. Some distinctions are important: fetal research may be conducted on live or dead fetuses, on fetuses *in utero* or *ex utero*, on fetuses to be aborted or to be brought to term, and on pre-viable or viable fetuses. It is also important to distinguish research that may benefit the subject as well as others (sometimes called therapeutic research) and research that is designed only to benefit others (sometimes called non-therapeutic research) and to distinguish degrees of risk (e.g., minimal, moderate, and serious). Questions about the proper balance of risks or burdens and benefits arise in this area as in other research, but pointing to the benefits of research for fetuses as a group—and there have been major benefits—may not justify the risks or burdens imposed on particular fetuses in particular experiments.

As André Hellegers (1978) noted, the guidelines proposed by the Peel Commission in Great Britain in 1972 and by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in the USA in 1975 share several features: "They have in common that dead fetuses and their tissues are to be afforded the respect of other dead human bodies and tis-

